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FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL AGENCY REFORM
Gillian E. Metzger

INTRODUCTION
Preemption has emerged as the contemporary federalism battleground.
Struggles over preemption have surfaced repeatedly in recent years, first over
aggressive use of agency preemption by the Bush administration,1 and more
recently in connection to the major healthcare and financial sector reforms and
proposed climate change legislation.2 Preemption‘s dominance is as evident in
the judicial sphere, with the federal courts regularly engaging preemption
claims in a wide array of contexts. State and local governments increasingly
have protested expansions of federal preemption, and legal scholars have
sounded alarms over the impact of creeping preemption on state governance
capacity.3


Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Special thanks to Abbe Gluck, Vicki Jackson, Tom
Merrill, Henry Monaghan, Trevor Morrison, Cathy Sharkey, Kevin Stack, and participants at the
Federalism Roundtable held at Vanderbilt University School of Law and faculty workshops at
Columbia Law School and FSU Law School for their very helpful comments and suggestions,
and to Devi Rao for exceptional research and editorial assistance.
1. See Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional and State
Authority?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (regarding
regulatory preemption). Recent measures proposed by the Obama Administration expressly
limiting preemption reflect the attention the issue has received. See, e.g., President Barack
Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies re: Preemption, 74
Fed. Reg. 24,693, 24,693–94 (May 20, 2009) [hereinafter Obama Preemption Memo] (regarding
preemption).
2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 1041-1048, 124 Stat. 1376, 2011–2019 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5551)
(addressing preservation of state law in conjunction with proposed federal consumer financial
protection legislation); Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 861
(2009) (proposing preemption of state and local cap-and-trade programs); Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5–6, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 3:10CV188
(E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2010) (challenging federal healthcare legislation under Commerce Clause as
unconstitutional preemption); Robert Pear, State Insurance Experts See Flaws in Obama‘s Plan to
Curb Premiums, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 2010, at A18 (noting issue of preemption of state regulation
of health insurance rate oversight).
3. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Preemption War: When Federal Bureaucracies
Trump Local Juries 21 (2008) (―The preemption war is a manifestation of the latest and, in many
ways, most threatening attempt to change state common law by replacing it with a body of
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This was the background against which the Court in its 2008–2009 Term
issued three major preemption decisions: Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,4 Wyeth
v. Levine,5 and Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n.6 Notably, preemption claims
failed in all three of these closely divided decisions, with the Court invoking
federalism-based presumptions against preemption as well as the need to
respect traditional federal and state functions to guide its analysis.7 These
decisions, moreover, limit administrative agencies‘ preemption powers in ways
that could have significant prospective effect in protecting state law against
displacement by executive branch actions. Further, the Court‘s refusal to defer
to the pro-preemption views of the administrative agencies involved in Wyeth
and Cuomo indicates that a majority of Justices view preemption
determinations as different from other statutory interpretation questions—a
difference that appears to turn on the federalism effects of preemption.8 The
impact of these decisions on tort litigation and preemption analysis generally is
likely to be significant, at least in the short term. Wyeth is particularly
portentous given its importance for failure to warn and other drug-related state
law tort suits.9 More broadly, the decisions signal some judicial resistance
regulatory law that is kinder and gentler to the regulated entities.‖); William W. Buzbee,
Introduction, in Preemption Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism‘s Core
Question 1, 3 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (―Virtually all chapters in this book contribute to
the development of normative arguments against preemption by using theoretical, legal, and
historical analysis to explore the logic behind the long dominant choice of retention of federal,
state, local, and common law regulatory power.‖); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by
Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 227, 242
(2007) [hereinafter, Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble] (―Should this regulatory preemption trend
continue . . . [a]gencies would be selectively empowered to act in one direction only—to oust
competing state power . . . .‖); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court‘s Two Federalisms, 83
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 130 (2004) [hereinafter Young, Two Federalisms] (―The whole point of
preemption is generally to force national uniformity on a particular issue, stifling state-by-state
diversity and experimentation.‖); Preemption Monitor, April 7, 2010 (Nat‘l Conf. of State
Legislatures, Washington, D.C.), at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=20109 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (reviewing recently enacted federal legislation that preempts state
authority). Not all academic treatments have viewed increased preemption negatively. See
generally Federal Preemption: States‘ Powers, National Interests (Richard A. Epstein & Michael
S. Greve eds., 2007) (discussing benefits of modern preemption doctrine).
4. 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
5. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
6. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009).
7. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2717–18, 2720–21 (considering incursion on traditional state
powers); Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194–95, 1199–1200 (invoking presumption against preemption);
Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 543–44 & n.6 (considering clear statement rule especially important in ―field
traditionally occupied by the States‖).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 56–64.
9. See Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 391–96 (7th Cir. 2010) (calling
Wyeth ―our intellectual anchor‖ in holding failure-to-warn claim was not preempted by federal
regulation); Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428 433–35, 437–39, 445–49 (5th Cir. 2010)
(relying on Wyeth to hold FDA regulation did not preempt state failure-to-warn claims against
drug manufacturer); Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 607–12 (8th Cir. 2009) (relying on
Wyeth to conclude that ―[t]he obligation [plaintiff] seeks to impose upon generic manufacturers
does not obstruct the purposes and objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments [to the FDCA]
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toward statutory interpretations or other administrative efforts that aggressively
expand the preemptive scope of federal action. In light of the close votes in
these cases and Justice Stevens‘s pivotal role in opposing preemption, whether
these decisions have a longer lasting effect is harder to predict.10 The
decisions themselves also leave open some important questions, such as the
preemptive effect of a regulation with legal force.11
The Obama
Administration‘s greater resistance to preemption may mean that it will be a
while before such questions are resolved.12
Even more interesting, however, is how the decisions frame the
relationship between the states and federal agencies and what they suggest
about the role of the states in national administrative governance. A striking
feature of the decisions is the extent to which they are centrally concerned with
using state law and preemption analysis to improve federal agency
performance—what I refer to here as federal agency reform. This focus is
particularly salient in Wyeth, which argued that the potential for state liability
assisted federal regulators by giving regulated entities an incentive to disclose
evidence of potential risks. Wyeth also used judicial control over preemption
determinations to encourage greater agency sensitivity to state interests.13
Wyeth‘s concern with federal agency performance is also present in the other
decisions, which portray state enforcement as complementing federal
administration and serving to avoid regulatory gaps. Traditional federalism
concerns about protecting the states from unjustified national intrusions clearly
factored into the Court‘s analysis as well. Yet, in the end, the decisions seem
to treat the preservation of state authority less as a goal worth pursuing in its
own right than instrumentally as an important mechanism for guarding against
federal agency failure.
In arguing that the recent preemption decisions use preemption analysis to
improve federal regulation and federal agency performance, I do not mean to
suggest that this goal was consciously or actually animating the Court. It may
have been, but other motivations are equally possible. To a significant degree,
the Justices‘ differing stances on preemption tracked the ―liberal‖ and
―conservative‖ division on the Court, suggesting that a major driver behind the
decisions may be different ideological stances on tort reform and the benefits
of regulation.14 At a minimum, the inconsistencies across recent preemption

in any way‖); Catherine M. Sharkey, Drug Advertising Claims: Preemption‘s New Frontier, 41
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1625, 1625–26, 1647 (2008) (noting, pre-Wyeth ―all eyes are on Wyeth‖ and
that ―[t]he courts are roughly evenly split on the question [of preemption of failure-to-warn
claims] and await guidance from the United States Supreme Court‖).
10. Justice Stevens, who retired at the end of last Term, wrote both Altria and Wyeth and
was one of the most consistent antipreemption votes on the Court.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 52–54.
12. See Obama Preemption Memo, supra note 1, at 24,693–94 (imposing restrictions on
preemption assertions by heads of departments and agencies).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 68–69.
14. This account gains support not simply from the voting pattern in these decisions, in
which the liberal Justices voted unanimously against preemption and the conservative Justices
largely in favor, but also in scholarship documenting a probusiness trend on the Roberts Court.
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precedent and among the positions of different Justices makes it clear that ―the
Court‖ itself lacks a coherent view on most questions relating to preemption.
This area of jurisprudence is a prime occasion for remembering that the Court,
like Congress, ―is a they, not an it.‖15
Instead, my claim is that reading the decisions as fundamentally
concerned with improving federal administration and the potential for federal
agency failure offers the most analytically coherent account of the decisions,
whatever the Justices‘ actual motivations. At the same time, however, this
account underscores tensions between the recent preemption decisions and
other lines of the Court‘s jurisprudence. In particular, the decisions stand in
sharp contrast with other recent preemption precedent in which the Court has
rejected efforts to use state tort law to police federal regulation.16 They are
also at odds with administrative law decisions rejecting efforts to use the courts
to broadly reform federal administration.17 To be sure, courts routinely
entertain challenges to particular agency actions, often overturning agency
determinations as contrary to statutory requirements, insufficiently reasoned,
and the like. But lawsuits targeting agency performance more generally have
found little judicial receptivity.18 In the recent decisions rejecting preemption,
however, the Court underscored concerns about just such broader
administrative performance. Unfortunately, the Court itself neither explained
nor acknowledged these tensions in its jurisprudence, and thus offered little
guidance for how we should make sense of the divergence.
This Article first explores the connection between the states and federal
agency reform immanent in the preemption decisions and then assesses
whether grounds exist to distinguish the recent preemption decisions from
other precedent more hostile to policing federal administration through the
courts. One possible explanation of the Court‘s conflicting jurisprudence, and
the one on which I focus here, is as reflecting a distinction between direct and
indirect efforts at federal agency reform. The key difference between these
See, e.g., David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business-Friendly Court? Explaining the Chamber of
Commerce‘s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1019, 1019 (2009) (―[I]n the
less than three full Terms of the Roberts Court, the Chamber [of Commerce] has been not only
unusually active but unusually successful . . . .‖). It should be noted, however, that the Court‘s
recent preemption jurisprudence is not entirely reducible to a liberal-conservative ideological
dispute. For example, the voting patterns in Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (eight
Justices supporting preemption of state tort suit) and Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1
(2007) (decision supporting preemption written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by ―liberal‖
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Alito over dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia) do not fit the purely ideological story.
15. Kenneth A. Schepsle, Congress Is a ―They,‖ Not an ―It‖: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 Int‘l Rev. L. & Econ. 239, 244 (1992); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Constitutional Constraints, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 975, 1020 (2009) (extrapolating to the context of the
Court). For a discussion of some points of overall agreement among the Justices, see infra text
accompanying note 55.
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part II.B
18. See infra text accompanying notes 182–189.
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two approaches is the extent to which federal administrative policies or actions
are directly challenged or otherwise targeted. A suit seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief against a federal agency for failing to meet its statutory
responsibilities is the paradigmatic example of a direct agency reform effort,
but direct targeting of federal agency action can take other forms as well.
Thus, I include in this category other efforts that call the validity of federal
administrative actions into question, such as tort actions against federal officers
or tort actions between private parties alleging that federal administrative
decisions were fraudulently obtained.19 Indeed, even a state statute that seeks
to reinforce federal regulation by expressly tying state law liability to violation
of federal requirements is arguably an instance of direct targeting and best
viewed as a direct effort at federal agency reform.20 Indirect reform efforts, by
contrast, are those that seek to influence how federal agencies function in a
more roundabout way. As portrayed in Wyeth, state law and judicial
preemption analysis improve federal administration in an indirect fashion.
They provide information and incentives to encourage better federal regulatory
performance, but federal agencies retain control over whether they alter their
behavior in response. Significantly, the Court‘s resistance to efforts to improve
federal administration has occurred in contexts in which federal agency
performance was more directly targeted by the federal and state law claims
involved.
A distinction between direct and indirect efforts to improve agency
performance has some real bite, particularly in the federalism sphere.
Independent state measures that affect federal agencies only indirectly have a
strong intuitive claim to presumptive legitimacy, whereas certain state law
efforts to directly challenge federal administration are appropriately viewed as
presumptively preempted. I ultimately conclude, however, that drawing such a
firm distinction is analytically and normatively unsatisfying. State measures
do not clearly sort into direct and indirect categories, and even indisputably
indirect measures can have a significant impact on federal agency operations.
Nor, moreover, do direct state efforts to alter federal administration necessarily
run afoul of constitutional federalism principles. Instead, in our contemporary
world of concurrent federal and state authority and an ever-expanding national
administrative state, some direct state targeting of federal agencies—including
even state law claims that may call the validity of federal administrative
decisions into question—seems both constitutionally legitimate and
functionally necessary if states are to play a meaningful governance role.
This leaves the possibility of a more radical account of the relationship
between the states and federal agencies, one which would assign the states a
special role in policing and reforming federal administration—both directly
and indirectly. Although this possibility gains some support from Wyeth and
other recent precedent, it potentially portends a dramatic departure from
existing jurisprudence. More importantly, the Court has so far failed to

19. See infra text accompanying notes 210–216, 257–260.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 235–242.
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provide crucial clarification for such an approach, both with respect to the
scope of the states‘ role and the underlying justification for assigning them
special responsibilities to improve federal administration.
Part I of what follows outlines the three preemption decisions and briefly
discusses their implications for current preemption debates. It then turns to
assessing the extent to which the decisions are best viewed as an effort to
vindicate the constitutional federal structure, concluding that federalism alone
fails to fully explain the decisions. Instead, fears of agency failure appear a
more central dynamic, with the decisions strategically using state law and
preemption analysis as mechanisms for improving federal administrative
performance. Part II contrasts this emphasis on improving federal performance
with both the Court‘s resistance to fraud-on-the-agency claims and its
administrative law precedent rejecting challenges to agency policy and
performance. It argues that what distinguishes the recent preemption decisions
is their indirect regulatory approach. Part III then assesses the extent to which
an indirect approach to improving federal agency performance is either
functionally superior or constitutionally mandated.
After finding the
distinction between direct and indirect efforts at federal agency reform
ultimately unsatisfying, Part III also considers the possibility of a broader role
for the states in reforming federal administration.
I. FEDERALISM AS CORE OR FEDERALISM AS PERIPHERY?
Preemption disputes are a staple of the Supreme Court‘s docket,21
resulting in both a substantial preemption jurisprudence and an ever-growing
academic commentary. That commentary has been increasingly critical of late,
as scholars have faulted the Court‘s performance on preemption questions on a

21. Michael Greve and Jonathan Klick report that the Court has had an average of just under
six preemption cases on its docket per term from October Term (O.T.) 1986 to O.T. 2003.
Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Empirical Assessment, 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 43, 49 (2006). After its three major preemption
decisions in O.T. 2008, the Court granted certiorari in only two preemption-related cases in O.T.
2009. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010)
(holding state civil procedure rule preempted by federal class action rule for diversity suits in
federal court); Pollitt v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 558 F.3d 615, 616 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 130
S. Ct. 396 (2009), and cert. dismissed, 130 S. Ct. 1574 (2010) (holding ―complete preemption‖
does not apply to field of health insurance coverage for federal employees). As of September
2010, however, the Court has four preemption cases on its docket for O.T. 2010. Laster v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom., AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) (preemption under Federal Arbitration Act); Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010) (preemption under
Vaccine Act); Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted sub nom., Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010) (preemption
under Immigration Reform and Control Act); Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 84 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 545 (Ct. App. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3348 (2010) (preemption under federal
motor vehicle safety standards).
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number of grounds: for deviating from constitutional text and structure;22 for
being insufficiently sensitive or overly sensitive to state interests;23 for
ignoring important political or regulatory features;24 and for being
inconsistent.25 Such claims of inconsistency have underscored the variation
both in the Court‘s stated analysis, especially in its invocation of the
presumption against preemption, and in its application of governing doctrine in
different cases.26 The Court‘s most recent preemption decisions provide more
fodder for those debates. The discussion below begins with a brief overview
of the decisions and analysis of their import for preemption doctrine. It then
assesses the extent to which the decisions are best explained by federalism
principles rather than alternative concerns. Rejecting a straightforward
federalism analysis, it concludes that agency failure is the central analytic
theme in the decisions, with federalism in the form of state law and preemption
analysis serving primarily as a mechanism for improving federal agency
performance.
22. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L.J. 2085, 2096
(2000) (―[C]onstitutional text, structure, and history does not support the application of the
assumption in all contexts as a general presumption against preemption.‖); Caleb Nelson,
Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 293 (2000) (―A general rule that express preemption clauses
should be read ‗narrowly,‘ so that they contradict the fewest potential state laws, is hard to square
with the Supremacy Clause‘s non obstante provision.‖). But see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1321, 1429 (2001) (―[C]ontrary to
Professor Dinh‘s assessment, the constitutional structure appears to favor a presumption against
preemption because the Constitution gives states a role in selecting Congress and the President,
but not federal courts.‖).
23. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 22, at 2097 (arguing presumption against preemption is too
sensitive to state interests); Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 3, at 130–33 (urging greater
sensitivity to state interests); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine A. Sharkey, Backdoor
Federalization, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1353, 1372 (2006) (describing trend toward greater
federalization).
24. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1554–55 (2007) (emphasizing importance of
differentiating between federal floors and ceilings in assessing preemption claims); Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process,
82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 6–10 (2007) [hereinafter Hills, Against Preemption] (arguing preemption
rules should be structured to foster congressional action); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in
Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory, and Default Rules, in Federal Preemption:
States‘ Powers, National Interests, supra note 3, at 166, 183–85, 187–88 (emphasizing importance
of subject matter and state externalities in analyzing preemption questions).
25. See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 22, at 2085 (―Notwithstanding its repeated claims to the
contrary, the Supreme Court‘s numerous preemption cases follow no predictable jurisprudential
or analytical pattern.‖); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values,
71 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 687–88 (1991) (―[T]he United States Supreme Court has failed to articulate
a coherent standard for deciding preemption cases, and its haphazard approach fails to provide
meaningful guidance to lower courts, legislators, and citizens.‖); Nelson, supra note 22, at 232
(―Most commentators who write about preemption agree on at least one thing: Modern
preemption jurisprudence is a muddle.‖).
26. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: More Muddle,
or Creeping to Clarity?, 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 197, 221 (2009) (―[T]he Court‘s invocation and use of
the presumption against preemption has been quite inconsistent.‖); Catherine M. Sharkey,
Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 449, 458 n.30
(2008) [hereinafter, Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption] (collecting sources).
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A. Setting the Stage: The 2008–2009 Term Preemption Decisions
In the ongoing debate over preemption, two issues have taken center
stage: the authority of federal administrative agencies to preempt state law,27
and protections against preemption of state tort law.28 These two issues are
often intertwined, as administrative action has become a prime basis for claims
of state tort law preemption and administrative agencies have intentionally
sought to wield their powers to that effect. Both administrative preemption
and tort preemption have surfaced increasingly in recent preemption cases, but
were often sidestepped by the Court in its opinions.29 In the 2008–2009 Term,
however, the Court addressed both issues more directly in three major
decisions: Altria v. Good, Wyeth v. Levine, and Cuomo v. Clearing House
Ass’n. Each involved preemption claims based on federal agency action, with
Altria and Wyeth also addressing the question of preemption in the context of
state law tort claims. Notably, the Court rejected the preemption claims in all
three decisions, a result somewhat at odds with the trend of the Court‘s
preemption jurisprudence over the last decade.30 Moreover, the results in
these decisions arguably conflicted with several of the Court‘s recent

27. For recent scholarship addressing this issue, see generally, William W. Buzbee,
Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for Stewardship and
Intergenerational Equity, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1521 (2009) [hereinafter Buzbee, Hard Look];
Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law‘s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and
Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 Duke L.J. 1933 (2008); Nina A. Mendelson, A
Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 695 (2008) [hereinafter
Mendelson, Presumption]; Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 727 (2008) [hereinafter Merrill, Institutional Choice]; Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative
Law as the New Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 2023 (2008) [hereinafter Metzger, New Federalism];
Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 869 (2008).
28. For discussion of the issue of tort law preemption, see generally Richard A. Epstein, The
Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 463 (2009); Peter H.
Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13
Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 73 (2008); Mark Seidenfeld, Who Decides Who Decides: Federal
Regulatory Preemption of State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 611 (2010); Sharkey,
Preemption by Preamble, supra note 3; Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 26;
Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, J. Tort
L., Dec. 2006.
29. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 20 (2007) (―[U]nder our
interpretation of the statute, the level of deference owed to the regulation is an academic
question.‖).
30. Jonathan Klick and Michael Greve report that the Rehnquist Court ruled in favor of
preemption approximately half the time, though Catherine Sharkey has noted this rate increases to
60% in tort preemption cases. Compare Greve & Klick, supra note 21, at 57 tbl.5 (reporting 52%
of Rehnquist Court‘s 105 preemption rulings found state action preempted), with Sharkey,
Products Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 454 n.14 (noting Greve & Klick found ―62.5%
preemption rate in thirty-two cases involving preemption of state common-law tort claims from
1986 to 2004‖). During its 2004 to 2008 Terms, the Court decided seventeen preemption cases,
finding preemption in twelve (70%) of these cases. Although the recent trend has been toward
preemption, the Court has also rejected preemption claims on several occasions, in particular
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), and Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431
(2005).
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preemption decisions—a point made by the dissent in each case.31
1. The Decisions: Altria, Wyeth, and Cuomo.—In Altria, Maine smokers
brought an action under that state‘s Unfair Trade Practices Act alleging that a
tobacco company had deceived them with respect to the levels of tar and
nicotine they would receive from smoking its light cigarettes. The essence of
the smokers‘ claim was that the company knew that smokers of light cigarettes
unconsciously engage in compensating behaviors, such as blocking filter holes,
which means they inhale more tar and nicotine than accounted for by
measurements under the standard Cambridge Filter Method. The company
responded by invoking both express and obstacle preemption. It argued that
the suit was preempted both by the express preemption clause of the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and because liability would be an
obstacle to a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) policy encouraging reliance on
the Cambridge Filter Method for tar and nicotine yields.32
In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Stevens, the Court rejected both
preemption arguments. Following the earlier plurality opinion in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, the majority held that the Labeling Act‘s express preemption
clause encompassed only state law rules targeted at smoking and health, and
accordingly did not reach a state law claim alleging breach of a general duty
not to deceive.33 Justice Thomas‘s dissent contended that the majority‘s
approach was incapable of consistent application and represented an unduly
narrow view of the clause.34 The majority further concluded that the FTC in
fact had no such policy as the company described, leaving open whether ―a
regulatory policy could provide a basis for obstacle pre-emption.‖35
According to the majority, the most the record revealed in support of the
company‘s argument was a ―handful of industry guidances and consent orders‖
allowing use of the Cambridge Filter Method and ―FTC[] inaction with regard
to ‗light‘ descriptors,‖ but ―agency nonenforcement of a federal statute is not
the same as a policy of approval.‖36
Two grounds for preemption were also asserted in Wyeth. Wyeth began as
a state court tort action in which a jury found a drug manufacturer liable for

31. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass‘n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2730–31 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting ―[t]he Court‘s conclusion in Watters that [the
National Bank Act] deprives the States of inspection and enforcement authority over the
mortgage-lending practices of national banks lends weight to the agency‘s construction of the
statute‖ at issue here); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1217, 1220–22 (2009) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that majority‘s holding ―cannot be reconciled with Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)‖); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 552, 558–60 (2008)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that, particularly in light of Court‘s decision in Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), ―there is no authority for [the majority‘s] invoking the
presumption against pre-emption in express pre-emption cases,‖ and that the plurality‘s reading of
the Labeling Act was also undermined by Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)).
32. Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 541–42.
33. Id. at 545–49 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)).
34. Id. at 555–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 549–51 (majority opinion).
36. Id. at 550–51.
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failing to warn about dangers associated with direct injection of an antinausea
medication into patients‘ veins. The manufacturer first asserted impossibility
preemption, arguing that it could not comply with a state law duty to modify
the label of the drug, Phenergan, without violating federal laws restricting a
drug manufacturer‘s ability to alter a drug label without prior approval from
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).37 It also invoked obstacle
preemption, maintaining that allowing state law liability for failure to warn
about dangers associated with a drug would pose an obstacle to achieving
Congress‘s objectives in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of
assigning responsibility for drug labeling decisions to the FDA.38 In the
preamble of a recently promulgated drug labeling regulation, the FDA had
espoused a similar view, declaring that state law failure-to-warn actions
―threaten FDA‘s statutorily prescribed role as the expert Federal agency
responsible for evaluating and regulating drugs‖ and therefore ―FDA approval
of labeling . . . preempts conflicting or contrary State law.‖39
Once again the Court rejected both arguments for preemption, this time
by a 6-3 margin, with Justice Thomas concurring in the result.40 Justice
Stevens‘s majority opinion concluded that under governing regulations the
manufacturer could have added a stronger warning in light of accumulating
evidence of the dangers of direct intravenous administration and that the FDA
had not prohibited strengthening the warning in such a fashion.41 The majority
also rejected the view that state failure-to-warn suits would prove an obstacle
to achieving Congress‘s objectives for drug regulation in the FDCA, arguing
that the claim of FDA exclusivity was not supported by the statute‘s text,
history, or purpose of furthering consumer protection.42 Particularly notable
was the majority‘s refusal to grant the FDA‘s contrary view any weight as a
result of procedural deficiencies and inconsistencies in the agency‘s position
over time.43 The dissenting Justices, in an opinion by Justice Alito, agreed
with the manufacturer that preemption was appropriate on both impossibility
and obstacle preemption grounds.44 The most radical view was that espoused
by Justice Thomas, who contended in his concurrence that the very idea of
obstacle preemption was constitutionally illegitimate.45
Cuomo differed from the others not only in arising outside the tort
context, but also because it involved a state attorney general‘s effort to enforce
state law and a federal agency as a party seeking a declaration of preemption.
37. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193, 1196 (2009).
38. Id. at 1193, 1199.
39. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934–35 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified in scattered parts
of 21 C.F.R.).
40. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196–204.
41. Id. at 1196–99.
42. Id. at 1199–200.
43. Id. at 1200–03.
44. Id. at 1220 (Alito, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1205, 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), along with a banking
trade group, argued that state officials were preempted from seeking to enforce
state laws against national banks by the general prohibition on state exercise of
―visitorial powers‖ over national banks in the National Bank Act (NBA). The
OCC had previously issued a regulation interpreting ―visitorial powers‖ to
include enforcing compliance with state and federal law.46 The Court in a 5-4
decision rejected the OCC‘s broad claim of preemption.47 The majority
opinion, this time authored by Justice Scalia, held that the OCC‘s regulation
interpreting visitorial powers to include suit by a state attorney general to
enforce state law was not a credible reading of the statute.48 The majority
agreed, however, that the NBA precluded state administrative investigatory
and supervisory efforts unrelated to bringing a judicial enforcement action.49
Justice Thomas‘s dissent contended that the OCC‘s regulation represented a
perfectly reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term by the
agency charged with implementing the statute and deserved the Court‘s
deference.50
2. The Decisions’ Import for Preemption Analysis.—The fact that these
cases were all decided by close votes and contained vigorous dissents indicates
that the Court remains quite divided about preemption. It is thus hard to assess
the long-term impact the decisions will have, especially on highly disputed
issues, such as how broadly or narrowly to read an express preemption clause,
on which the Court seemed to deviate from recent precedent.51 Moreover,
some key questions were left open, in particular the extent to which federal
administrative regulations with the force of law—that is, substantive
regulations or decisions that impose binding legal obligations, as opposed to
regulations that simply interpret governing statutes or provide general
guidance—can preempt state law.52 Also unclear is whether the Court will
46. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass‘n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2714–15 (2009).
47. Id. at 2721–22. The result in Cuomo was codified subsequently in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1047, 124 Stat.
1376, 2018 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 25b, 1465).
48. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715–19. The Court also rejected the OCC‘s interpretation of its
regulation as not preempting state enforcement of general legal requirements, such as state
contract law, as at odds with the text of the regulation as well as the NBA. Id. at 2719–20.
49. Id. at 2721–22.
50. Id. at 2722–28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. Compare Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (choosing narrow reading
of express preemption clause disfavoring preemption and refusing to find implied preemption),
with Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316 (2008) (reading express preemption clauses to
find preemption), Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 550–51 (2001) (same), and
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884–86 (2000) (finding implied preemption after
refusing to find preemption based on express preemption clause).
52. In Wyeth, the Court noted that it had previously held ―an agency regulation with the
force of law can pre-empt conflicting state requirements,‖ but emphasized that it was ―faced with
no such regulation‖ here and had ―no occasion in this case to consider the pre-emptive effect of a
specific agency regulation bearing the force of law,‖ distinguishing Geier on this ground. Wyeth
v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200–01, 1203 (2009). Although the majority appeared to leave this
question open, Justice Breyer made clear in his concurrence that in his view agencies could issue
specific regulations with legal force that have preemptive effect. Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J.,
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require an express delegation by Congress of preemptive authority for such an
agency regulation to have preemptive effect,53 and the extent to which an
agency must have demonstrably considered an issue to support a claim of
actual conflict.54
Nonetheless, the decisions, especially Wyeth, mark a significant
contribution to the Court‘s preemption jurisprudence. To begin with, they
indicate that the Court continues to believe that liability under state common

concurring). This was also the view of the three dissenting Justices in Wyeth, who argued that the
relevant FDA actions in fact had legal force and defended the result in Geier. Id. at 1227–29
(Alito, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas‘s position on this issue is much harder to parse. He was the sole Justice expressly
to renounce the Geier decision, but his objection to Geier—which also animated his concurrence
in Wyeth—was opposition to obstacle preemption, under which state laws are displaced on the
grounds that they are an obstacle to the achievement of general congressional purposes and
objectives. Id. at 1211–17 (Thomas, J., concurring). As a result, it seems possible that Justice
Thomas might support preemption when state law clearly conflicts with a valid regulation that
has independent legal force, though it seems likely he would require clear congressional
authorization of such preemptive authority. See id. at 1215 (―The Court‘s ‗purposes and
objectives‘ pre-emption jurisprudence is . . . problematic because it encourages an overly
expansive reading of statutory text.‖); see also Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2732–33 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (justifying deference to OCC‘s view of NBA‘s
preemptive scope on grounds that statute includes express preemption clause and thus Congress
made decision to preempt, not the agency).
53. In Wyeth, the majority emphasized the fact that ―Congress has not authorized the FDA
to pre-empt state law directly‖ as another reason why deference to the FDA‘s views on
preemption would be inappropriate. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201. It did not specify, however,
exactly how such an authorization would affect the preemption analysis and in particular whether
clear congressional authorization is necessary for an agency regulation with the force of law to
have preemptive effect. Justice Thomas would appear to require such clear authorization, see
supra note 52, whereas the fact that Justice Breyer was willing to allow FDA regulations with
legal force to have preemptive effect indicates he would not impose such a requirement, see
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring), and neither would the three dissenting Justices,
see id. at 1220, 1227–30 (Alito, J., dissenting). Neither Cuomo nor Altria addressed the
question—although the Cuomo majority‘s refusal to defer to the OCC‘s regulation interpreting
the ambiguous term ―visitorial powers,‖ combined with its insistence that this interpretation was
in substance no different than a declaration of preemptive effect, suggests that more authorization
of administrative preemption than simply an express preemption clause is needed for the agency‘s
views on preemption to get strong deference. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2721 (describing OCC
regulation at issue as interpretive and declaratory of the NBA‘s preemptive force); see also
William Funk, Judicial Deference and Regulatory Preemption by Federal Agencies, 84 Tul. L.
Rev. 1233, 1242–49 (2010) [hereinafter Funk, Judicial Deference] (discussing role of statutory
authorization in assessing whether agency views on preemption get deference). Some scholars
have advocated requiring such clear authorization for agencies to have power to preempt. See,
e.g., Mendelson, Presumption, supra note 27, at 699 (advocating clear statement rule); Merrill,
Institutional Choice, supra note 27, at 767 (advocating ―super-strong‖ clear statement rule). But
see Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2071–72 (arguing clear statement rule is at odds
with current administrative law and ―would create extraordinary obstacles to federal
administrative governance‖).
54. See Douglas G. Smith, Preemption After Wyeth v. Levine, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 1435, 1436–
37 (2009) (arguing Wyeth suggests preemption is available when ―the FDA has specifically
considered the particular risks at issue‖).
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law can constitute a state law requirement or prohibition for purposes of an
express preemption clause. That view was an unstated but necessary
assumption of both Altria and Wyeth. It also is a point of growing consistency
in recent preemption decisions; the Term before, in Riegel, the Court strongly
adhered to the view that common law liability constitutes a requirement.55
The Court also remains committed to the possibility that state law liability
might be impliedly preempted because it creates an impermissible obstacle to
achievement of federal statutory objectives and purposes, even if such liability
is not at odds with the text of governing federal laws. None of the other
Justices in Wyeth joined Justice Thomas‘s concurrence attacking the legitimacy
of obstacle preemption. Their disagreement was not over the acceptability of
obstacle preemption in principle, but rather over its application to the case at
hand.
More important is Wyeth‘s insistence that conclusions of preemptive
effect are ultimately for the courts to make in their independent judgment, at
least absent an express delegation to an agency of preemptive authority.56
Although a court may give weight to an agency‘s ―explanation of state law‘s
impact on the federal scheme,‖ it appears that without such an express
delegation agencies generally receive at best limited deference of the Skidmore
variety for their preemption determinations.57 In emphasizing the need for
independent judicial determination of preemption and limited agency
deference, Wyeth clarifies a frequent issue of dispute in preemption cases.58
55. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323–25 (2008). The identification of
common law liability as a requirement was first made by the plurality opinion in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522–23 (1992), and then called into question by intervening
decisions. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63–64 (2002) (holding that statutory
reference to a ―law or regulation‖ in express preemption clause, combined with savings clause,
meant Congress did not intend to include common law claims (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 4306
(2000))); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487–91, 502–03 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(distinguishing Cipollone based on potentially ―far greater interference with state legal remedies‖
from preemption in the Medtronic context). The Court also held that common law duties, but not
a tort verdict, could be state law requirements in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431,
443–46, 454 (2005) (calling tort verdict ―[a]n occurrence that merely motivates an optional
decision,‖ not preemptive ―requirement‖).
56. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
57. Id.; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (―The weight of [the
Administrator‘s] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.‖). For a similar
conclusion, see Funk, Judicial Deference, supra note 53, at 1251–52 (finding courts apply ―weak
or Skidmore deference‖); see also Bhagwat, supra note 26, at 207 (―Note that adding up these
votes, five of the current Justices have joined opinions disclaiming deference to agency findings
of preemption.‖).
58. See, e.g., Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326–27 (suggesting Skidmore deference); Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 20–21 & n.13 (2007) (refusing to address level of deference
owed OCC regulation). The question of what deference, if any, to accord administrative
interpretations of preemptive effects has received substantial academic commentary. See, e.g.,
Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 737, 758–98 (2004) [hereinafter
Mendelson, Chevron] (arguing against Chevron deference for agency views on preemption and in
favor of Skidmore on case-by-case basis); Merrill, Institutional Choice, supra note 27, at 769–79
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Cuomo‘s subsequent invocation of the Chevron framework instead of
Skidmore surely muddies the waters a bit. This difference, however, may just
reflect that preemption in Cuomo turned on the meaning of an express
preemption clause rather than an implied preemption analysis assessing the
impact of state law on the overall federal scheme.59
In any event, what is more noteworthy about Cuomo is the extent to
which the majority opinion deviates from ordinary Chevron review by refusing
to defer to the OCC‘s regulation interpreting ―visitorial powers‖ in the NBA,
despite acknowledging that this term was ambiguous and the regulation had
been promulgated using full notice-and-comment procedures.60 Under
established Chevron/Mead analysis, an agency interpretation of an ambiguous
statutory term promulgated using full rulemaking procedures ordinarily
receives substantial deference.61 That the Wyeth Court did not grant greater
deference to the FDA‘s view of FDCA‘s preemptive effect is less surprising,
given the procedural deficiencies that marred the FDA‘s adoption of this view
as part of the drug labeling rule and its inclusion only in the rule‘s preamble.62
On the other hand, Wyeth‘s insistence on independent judicial judgment on
preemption, even with respect to agency regulations having the force of law,
also marks a deviation from standard Chevron analysis.63
It seems therefore that both Wyeth and Cuomo pull out administrative
preemption determinations for different judicial treatment than administrative
determinations usually receive.64 Also striking, however, is Wyeth‘s use of

(arguing for deference regarding need for, and consequence of, displacing state law if agency has
expertise in area); Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 491–99 (arguing for
Skidmore deference).
59. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass‘n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009); see also id. at 2732
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing agency did not declare
preemptive scope of NBA but instead interpreted term in statute‘s preemption clause).
60. See id. at 2715 (majority opinion) (noting ―some ambiguity as to the meaning of
‗visitorial powers‘‖ and insisting that Court could nonetheless ―discern the outer limits of the
term . . . through the clouded lens of history‖).
61. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (noting ―an agency‘s
power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking‖ is often good evidence
Congress intended its statutory interpretations to receive deference); see also Metzger, New
Federalism, supra note 27, at 2063–68 (describing other recent decisions in which Court appeared
to engage in unusually searching statutory scrutiny in cases involving federalism issues).
62. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (outlining deficiencies); see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 228–
31 (concluding classification rulings at issue ―present a case far removed . . . from notice-andcomment process‖ and therefore not entitled to Chevron deference); cf. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 338
n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting FDA‘s ―amicus brief interpreting a statute is entitled, at
most,‖ to Skidmore deference).
63. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27 (―[A]dministrative implementation of a particular
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.‖).
64. Wyeth‘s insistence on independent judicial determination of preemption supports my
colleague Thomas Merrill‘s suggestion that the Court is developing a special review doctrine for
preemption. See Merrill, Institutional Choice, supra note 27, at 766–69.
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administrative law to encourage more careful agency assessments of
preemption—evident in the majority‘s criticism of the FDA‘s failure to
provide states with notice and an opportunity to comment on its changed
preemption views or a detailed defense of that change.65 These requirements
of detailed explanation and justification for change are standard administrative
law requirements for reasoned administrative decisionmaking, appearing under
―hard look‖ arbitrary and capriciousness review as well as Skidmore
scrutiny.66 Moreover, this use by the majority of ordinary administrative law
to police administrative preemption determinations appears intentional, given
the opinion‘s statement that the Court would vary the degree of weight it
assigned to an agency‘s views based on the ―thoroughness, consistency, and
persuasiveness‖ of the agency‘s account.67 The clear lesson for agencies is
that they need to involve states in their preemption decisionmaking and offer
well-reasoned, expertise-based justifications for their views, carefully
explaining any change in their position on preemption over time, if they want
those views to be given weight by a court.68
B. What’s Federalism Got to Do with It?
One way of understanding these decisions is that they reflect judicial
unease over increasing federal displacement of state law and state regulatory
authority. Elsewhere I have argued that several recent decisions appear to be
using familiar administrative law doctrines, including a de facto more rigorous

65. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201–03.
66. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51–52
(1983) (noting that under arbitrary and capricious review ―the agency must explain the evidence
which is available, and must offer a ‗rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made‘‖ (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))); see
also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (holding no heightened
standard for decisions to change agency policy). An important difference between hard look
review and the approach outlined in Wyeth is that agency explanations failing the former are
remanded to the agency for further consideration, whereas flawed agency preemption
determinations are simply given no weight by courts in their own preemption analysis.
Nonetheless, in substance the two are closely similar. For arguments that courts should subject
agency preemption determinations and other agency decisions with federalism implications to
hard look arbitrary and capriciousness review, see Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at
2104–07. A number of scholars have advocated this approach to preemption determinations.
See, e.g., Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 27, at 1524–25; Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 27, at
2001; Karen A. Jordan, Opening the Door to ―Hard-Look‖ Review of Agency Preemption, 31 W.
New Eng. L. Rev. 353, 353 (2009); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: ―AgencyForcing‖ Measures, 58 Duke L.J. 2125, 2185–86 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, Federalism
Accountability].
67. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
68. A similar lesson is offered by Altria, albeit much more tacitly. The Court‘s conclusion
that an industry guidance and some consent orders did not translate into a potentially preemptive
FTC policy encouraging use of the Cambridge Filter Method suggests that an agency seeking to
adopt a position on preemption will need to use more formal procedures and to general effect.
Altria Grp. Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 549–51 (2008); see also Cuomo v. Clearing House
Ass‘n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2717–18 (2009) (emphasizing bizarre consequences of agency‘s view as
factor counting against it).
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Chevron scrutiny, to address federalism concerns.69 Viewed in this light, the
2008–2009 Term preemption decisions appear of a piece with this trend in the
Court‘s precedent. While I ultimately conclude federalism is not the dynamic
driving the decisions, it is undeniably an important factor in play.70 Both the
Altria and Wyeth majorities prominently invoked the presumption against
preemption at the outset of their analyses, emphasizing that ―we begin our
analysis ‗with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are]
not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.‘‖71 Altria‘s invocation of the presumption was
particularly notable given the presence of an express preemption clause in the
Labeling Act, and the majority‘s insistence that the presumption against
preemption should apply even in cases of express preemption provoked sharp
disagreement from the dissent.72 Similarly, the Wyeth majority rejected
arguments that the presumption was inappropriate in contexts long regulated
by the federal government (such as drug labeling), or in disputes over implied
conflict preemption.73 Wyeth also emphasized the need to ―respect . . . the
States as ‗independent sovereigns in our federal system.‘‖74
Although it eschewed invocation of the presumption,75 the Cuomo
majority gave perhaps even more extensive voice to federalism concerns.
Emphasizing ―the incursion that the Comptroller‘s regulation makes upon
traditional state powers,‖ the opinion noted that states had long enforced both
general and banking-specific laws against national banks.76
It also
characterized the OCC‘s ―bizarre‖ interpretation of the NBA—under which
states could apply but not enforce their laws against national banks—as
undermining the status of state enactments as law.77 Equally significant was
the majority‘s identification of the NBA as a ―mixed state/federal regime[] in
which the Federal Government exercises general oversight while leaving state
substantive law in place.‖78 Perception of Cuomo as motivated by federalism

69. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2067, 2069 (―[T]he searching scrutiny
in these decisions provides evidence that the Court is using administrative law analysis to address
federalism concerns . . . [and] the divide between ordinary and extraordinary [administrative law]
here is far from stark.‖).
70. See The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Leading Cases, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 264–65
(2009) (noting Wyeth Court grounded its decision in ―federalism-protecting presumption against
preemption‖).
71. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194–95(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)); Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 543 (quoting same).
72. See Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 543; id. at 556–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting Court had
not expressly invoked presumption in such contexts of late).
73. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1195 n.3; see also id. at 1228 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing
invocation of presumption was inappropriate).
74. Id. at 1195 n.3 (majority opinion) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996)).
75. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass‘n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2720 (2009).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2718.
78. Id.
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concerns is reinforced by the dissent, which took pains to refute federalismbased arguments against preemption.79
But cracks exist in this federalism story. One point to note at the outset is
that federalism concerns are not leading the Court to dramatically transform its
preemption analysis, even if they are affecting how that analysis is applied.
Again, no one on the Court appears to question that common law duties can
constitute state law requirements for preemption purposes, and eight Justices
continue to accept the legitimacy of implied obstacle preemption in
principle.80 The fact that the Wyeth Court expressly left open the question of
how it would treat regulations with legal force is also significant, as a refusal to
defer to agencies in that context would mark a more radical change from its
precedent—both preemption precedent and general administrative law
precedent—on how such regulations are reviewed.81 Thus, to some degree
federalism concerns appear to be coming in at the margin.
Another reason for skepticism is encapsulated in the question: Why now?
That federal preemption can significantly restrict state authority in areas of
traditional state concern is hardly news. Nonetheless, as the Altria dissent
noted, the Court has often failed to invoke the presumption against preemption
in construing express preemption clauses, as recently as the preceding Term.82
Indeed, the 2007 decision in Watters v. Wachovia Bank appeared to apply a
presumption in favor of preemption.83 The Court has also upheld claims of
preemption even when compliance with both state and federal law was
possible.84
It is true that the issue of administrative preemption has gained much
more attention from the Court over the last few years, largely in response to
federal agencies‘ propreemption shift during the Bush Administration and the
79. See id. at 2731–33 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 52, 55 (discussing obstacle preemption and common
law duties as state law requirements, respectively).
81. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2052, 2071–72 (discussing Court‘s
usual deference to substantive agency determinations and delegations of authority).
82. See Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 556 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(collecting cases). A number of scholars have underscored the Court‘s inconsistency, particularly
with respect to invoking the presumption. See Dinh, supra note 22, at 2105–07 (―[T]he Court‘s
application of obstacle preemption belies the insistence on a general presumption against
preemption, of whatever weight.‖); Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at
506–510 (arguing that presumption is inconsistently applied and is outcome determinative when
invoked); see also Nelson, supra note 22, at 290–92 (discussing failure of Court‘s presumption
against preemption).
83. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 12 (2007) (noting Court has
interpreted grants of power to national banks ―not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily preempting, contrary state law‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
84. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs‘ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) (finding
―conflict‖ when ―federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud‖);
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 885 (2000) (―While we certainly accept the
dissent‘s basic position that a court should not find pre-emption too readily in the absence of clear
evidence of a conflict . . . we find such evidence here.‖); see also United States v. Locke, 529
U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (noting presumption against preemption ―is not triggered when the State
regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence‖).
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resultant political and scholarly outcry.85
Tort preemption has also
increasingly risen to the fore, largely as a result of Cipollone, which held that
common law duties could constitute state law requirements for preemption
purposes.86 Some of the Court‘s greater sensitivity to federalism may thus
reflect growing awareness of the significant impact of these preemption trends
on the states. Apparent variation in the Court‘s sensitivity to federalism also
may reflect the Court‘s reading of different statutory regimes,87 or
idiosyncratic voting by particular Justices.88
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the Court has not been consistently
solicitous of state interests in preemption cases, even of late. A comparison of
the Court‘s two recent preemption decisions involving the NBA, Cuomo and
Watters, demonstrates this point starkly. The concern with preserving the
states‘ historic role in enforcing state law against national banks emphasized in
Cuomo made no appearance in Watters, which instead underscored the burdens
put on national banks from having to comply with varied state regimes and
duplicative oversight.89 Another notable contrast is between Altria and Wyeth,
on the one hand, and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., on the other. In Riegel, seven

85. See McGarity, supra note 3, at 3–5 (discussing Bush Administration‘s controversial use
of preemption to further ―tort reform‖ agenda); Buzbee, Hard Look, supra note 27, at 1550–51
(characterizing lobbyist ―entreaties for regulation‖ as attempts to ―preempt additional state
regulation and common law tort liabilities‖); Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 3, at
227–28 (calling Bush administration preemption policy ―‗silent tort reform‘‖ (quoting Stephen
Labaton, ―Silent Tort Reform‖ Is Overriding States‘ Powers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2006, at C5);
see also infra text accompanying note 130 (noting increased attention to and critique of this
administrative trend in briefs).
86. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992); see also Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 441 (2005) (―It was only after [Cipollone] . . . that a
groundswell of federal and state decisions emerged holding that [FIFRA‘s preemption provision]
pre-empted claims like those advanced in this litigation.‖); McGarity, supra note 3, at 60 (noting
that, after ―exceedingly influential‖ Cipollone decision, ―federal preemption became the favored
defense for regulated companies seeking to avoid liability and accountability for harm caused by
their products and activities‖).
87. Preemption analysis is, after all, ultimately an exercise in statutory interpretation. See,
e.g., Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 548 (arguing that ―relating to‖ language in a preemption clause is
broader than ―based on‖); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass‘n, 552 U.S. 364, 377–78 (2008)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stressing breadth of preemption language in statute).
88. Justice Kennedy joined the majority in rejecting preemption in Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 540–
41, and Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1190 (2009), but supported preemption in Cuomo v.
Clearing House Ass‘n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2722 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), and in Watters, 550 U.S. at 4. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion
rejecting preemption in Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2714, but supported preemption in Altria, 129 S. Ct.
at 551 (Thomas, J., dissenting), and Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1217 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice
Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion in Watters, 550 U.S. at 4, which found preemption, but
signed onto the majority opinion rejecting preemption in Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2714. Justice
Breyer wrote the majority opinion upholding preemption in Geier, 529 U.S. at 864, but in his
concurrence in Wyeth he went out of his way to note that the Court did not have before it the
question of whether an agency regulation with the force of law could preempt state tort law—a
question he decided in the affirmative in Wyeth. 129 S. Ct. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring).
89. Watters, 550 U.S. at 11.
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members of the Court signed on to Justice Scalia‘s portrayal of state tort law as
little different from state regulation and, if anything, meriting less protection
given the limited expertise and perspective that jurors bring to bear.90 Another
possible response to the ―why now‖ question might be that the preemption
challenges in these three recent decisions posed particular threats to state
sovereignty. The majority opinions do at times suggest as much, with their
references to the traditional state protective roles that preemption would
eviscerate.91 But the state functions under attack—providing tort remedies for
individuals injured by unlawful conduct or enforcing state laws—have been at
issue in other recent cases and received a less protective response.92
More importantly, the results in these cases produced limited protection
for states as active legislators and regulators, with ―active‖ here being the
extent to which state officials are able to develop and implement state policies
on specific issues of concern. All three decisions focused primarily on the
ability to sue on state law claims in state or federal court, rather than on the
ability of states to take legislative or administrative action. Underlying this
point is the recognition that the ―states‖ are not a single identifiable entity, but
instead are comprised of a variety of institutions, officials, and functions.93
The preemption decisions protected two state institutions, state courts and state
common law, but offered only limited room for actions by the states‘
politically elected leaders.94
States play a particularly passive role in the types of damages actions
preserved in Altria and Wyeth, given that decisions to sue and decisions about
liability are made by private individuals, whether as plaintiffs or as members of
the jury. The only state official clearly involved is a state judge, and then only
if the action is brought in state court. True, states can play a more active role
by enacting statutes to address particular harms, rather than simply relying
upon traditional judicially developed common law rules. Indeed, the damages
action in Altria arose under such a state statute.95 Of greater significance
perhaps, the state statute at issue in Altria expressly provides for enforcement
by the state attorney general as well as by private damages actions, and thus
the decision could be said to also protect some enforcement role for state
officials.96 On the other hand, Altria offers a strong caution against states
90. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 324–25 (2008).
91. See sources cited supra note 7.
92. See, e.g., Riegel, 552 U.S. at 324–25 (finding state tort remedies preempted); Watters,
550 U.S. at 7 (preempting state enforcement of state licensing and oversight of state-chartered
subsidiaries of national banks).
93. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State
and Local Officials from State Legislatures‘ Control, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1201, 1201 (1999) (―In
discussions about American federalism, it is common to speak of a ‗state government‘ as if it
were a black box, an individual speaking with a single voice. . . . [A] ‗state‘ actually incorporates
a bundle of different subdivisions, branches, and agencies . . . .‖)
94. Nor is it at all clear which state actor best represents the interests served by state
common law. See Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 66, at 2157 (―There is no a
priori representative of state interests served by the common law . . . .‖).
95. See Maine Unfair Trade Protection Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 207 (Supp. 2009).
96. See id. § 209 (2002 & Supp. 2009) (giving AG enforcement power); id. § 211 (giving
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playing too much of a regulatory role, with the majority concluding that the
state law at issue was not preempted precisely because it embodied a general
duty not to deceive and was not aimed at smoking or health.97 Efforts by the
attorney general to use the statute to address smoking-related harms thus might
well be viewed more skeptically; indeed, the Court previously invalidated a
similar attempt in this vein by the Massachusetts Attorney General.98
Wyeth, meanwhile, involved a traditional common law failure-to-warn
claim. Thus, even the background state legislative involvement found in Altria
was lacking. Moreover, the Wyeth majority justified its rejection of
preemption in terms quite specific to common law suits. For example, it
emphasized the compensatory functions and beneficial incentives associated
with tort suits and concluded specifically ―that Congress did not regard state
tort litigation as an obstacle to achieving its purposes.‖99 As a result, Wyeth‘s
resistance toward preemption may well not extend to contexts involving more
active and targeted state regulation, where the Court might perceive greater
potential for conflict between federal and state requirements.
State officials were much more actively involved in Cuomo, which upheld
a state attorney general‘s ability to sue to enforce state law. Equally important,
Cuomo rejected the OCC‘s effort to restrict state enforcement to general state
laws, emphasizing that Congress chose not to exempt national banks from state
banking laws.100 Cuomo thus affirms targeted state regulation of banking and
more active state governance in this area. Strikingly, however, Cuomo denied
state officials access to their traditional administrative enforcement authority,
insisting that a state‘s enforcement of its banking laws against national banks
could only occur in connection with a court proceeding.101 The net result is
that, as a formal matter, state officials are denied the ability to exercise ―any
form of administrative oversight‖ over national banks, including the ability to
issue administrative subpoenas targeted to identifying potential violations of
state law.102 The majority justified this prohibition on administrative
AG investigatory power). The Vermont Attorney General recently won a judgment against R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. under an analogous Vermont consumer fraud statute and the tobacco
master settlement agreement. See David Kesmodel, Cigarette Maker Loses Vermont Marketing
Suit, Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 2010, at B4.
97. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 545–46 (2008).
98. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 548–51 (2001) (holding preempted
state regulations addressing sale and advertising of cigarettes promulgated by Massachusetts
Attorney General under state unfair and deceptive trade practices statute); see also Sprietsma v.
Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63 (2002) (reading language ―a law or regulation‖ in express
preemption clause as ―impl[ying] a discreteness—which is embodied in statutes and
regulations—that is not present in the common law‖); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
489–90 (1996) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing between specific and general duties and holding
only specific duties were preempted under statute at issue).
99. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1199–1200, 1202 (2009).
100. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass‘n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2718 (2009).
101. Id. at 2718, 2721–22.
102. Id. at 2721. In practice, ―formally‖ may prove an important caveat, as banks may well
prefer to voluntarily provide information sought by state officials as a means of forestalling suit.
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enforcement as mandated by the NBA‘s general bar on state exercise of
―visitorial powers . . . except as . . . vested in the courts of justice.‖103 Yet this
conclusion seems contradicted by the majority‘s own insistence that ―a
sovereign‘s ‗visitorial powers‘ and its power to enforce the law are two
different things.‖104
Nor, moreover, would allowing administrative
enforcement of state law necessarily lead to the unconstrained discretion
associated with visitorial powers, particularly if the limits on such
administrative oversight were outlined by the Court.105
In short, these decisions appear to assign the states a somewhat narrow
and passive role, perhaps excessively so. To be sure, federalism can mean
many things, and preserving state law‘s traditional remedial function or state
law enforcement in the courts certainly represents one account.106 But
federalism is often understood as embracing more than this, in particular as
protecting the ability of states to set policy and actively govern through their
elected officials.107 Indeed, providing room for such active governance is
critical if federalism is to achieve its purported benefits in our constitutional
system. As Ernest Young observes: ―[V]irtually all the values that federalism
is supposed to promote—such as regulatory diversity, political participation,
and restraints on tyranny—turn on the capacity of the states to exercise selfgovernment.‖108 The Court itself has identified the states‘ ability to legislate
See Trevor W. Morrison, The State Attorney General and Preemption, in Preemption Choice,
supra note 3, at 81, 87 (discussing use of visitorial power to generate information).
103. 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006).
104. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2717; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House:
The Supreme Court Responds to the Subprime Financial Crisis and Delivers a Major Victory for
the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, in The Panic of 2008: Causes,
Consequences and Implications for Reform (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.
eds., forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 6–12) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Supreme Court Responds],
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1499216 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing Cuomo and definition of ―visitorial powers‖ extensively).
105. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2719, 2721 (―Judges are trusted to prevent ‗fishing
expeditions‘ or an undirected rummaging through bank books and records for evidence of some
unknown wrongdoing.‖).
106. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194–95 & n.3 (2009) (noting ―state-law causes
of action‖ by which to deter harmful conduct and provide injured individuals with compensation
are an exercise of ―historic police powers of the States‖ and represent ―a field which the States
have traditionally occupied‖ (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))).
107. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity & Tragic
Compromise 12, 26–27 (2008) (defining federalism as entailing grant of partial autonomy to
geographic subdivisions and identifying federalism‘s insistence on ―allow[ing] geographic
subunits to choose divergent goals‖ as weakness of federalism compared to decentralization);
Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100
Colum. L. Rev. 215, 222 (2000) (―[F]ederalism is meant to preserve the regulatory authority of
state and local institutions to legislate policy choices.‖).
108. Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 3, at 4. Margaret Lemos has argued that this
focus on state exercise of independent regulatory authority unduly ignores the federalism
potential attendant simply on enforcement of federal law by state attorneys general. See Margaret
H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript
at 4, 24–28) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Lemos‘s criticism is apt and she rightly
identifies such state enforcement as providing an opportunity for states to play a governance role.
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and execute the law independently of federal direction as central to the
constitutional federalist structure, but it has rejected such autonomy for the
state courts.109 That the preemption decisions offer at best limited protection
for state self-governance through state political branches thus reinforces doubts
that federalism is the driving force underlying the decisions.
C. An Alternative Explanation: Agency Failure
Invocation of federalism in the preemption context is hardly surprising.
More unusual is another analytic theme that surfaces repeatedly in the
decisions: the Court‘s concern that federal agencies may be systematically
failing to meet their statutory responsibilities. An examination of the decisions
suggests that such fear of federal agency failure, and the role of state law and
state enforcement in improving federal regulatory performance, is central to
the reasoning and results in these decisions.110 This emphasis on reforming
and improving federal administrative performance is reinforced by the
decisions‘ emphasis on the regulatory role of tort law over its compensatory
function.
1. Agency Failure’s Centrality.—Although present in all three decisions,
concern about the potential for agency failure is particularly prominent in
Wyeth. The majority there emphasized the resource constraints under which
the FDA labors, noting that ―[t]he FDA has limited resources to monitor the
11,000 drugs on the market, and manufacturers have superior access to
information about their drugs, especially in the postmarketing phase as new
risks emerge.‖111 Equally important, the opinion portrays state law liability as
critical to encouraging information disclosure that is essential for FDA
oversight: ―State tort suits uncover unknown drug hazards and provide
incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly. They also

But she does not dispute the importance of state regulation to federalism, and indeed suggests that
state enforcement may be particularly relevant where states also enjoy some regulatory authority.
See id. (manuscript at 34, 36). In any event, as noted above, a striking feature of the preemption
decisions is the limited role played by state officials even in the enforcement arena, see supra text
accompanying notes 95–105.
109. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907, 924–30 (1997) (rejecting federal
commandeering of state executive officials and distinguishing requirement that state courts must
enforce federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (rejecting federal
commandeering of state legislatures); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding state
courts cannot refuse to enforce federal rights of action, at least if it hears analogous state law
claims).
110. In structuring preemption analysis to improve federal agency performance, the Court
has adopted a position in line with several tort scholars, who have argued in particular for
improved information disclosure on risks as a necessary price of federal administrative
preemption. See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 28, at 7; Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption,
supra note 26, at 513–20; see also Schuck, supra note 28, at 83 (favoring enhanced
―manufacturers‘ incentives to gather, analyze, and disclose all relevant risk information to the
FDA, Congress, and the public in a timely fashion‖).
111. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 (footnote omitted).
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serve a distinct compensatory function that may motivate injured persons to
come forward with information.‖112 The majority offered this account to
explain why the FDA had ―traditionally regarded state law as a complementary
form of drug regulation‖ and thus its switch to viewing FDA regulation as
exclusive represented ―a dramatic change in position.‖113 But the Court was
equally concerned to demonstrate that the FDA‘s new view was unreasonable.
To that end, the majority included a lengthy footnote in which it quoted from
several reports arguing that the FDA lacked the resources and staff to
adequately protect consumers on its own.114
The Wyeth majority thus invoked two separate instances of FDA failure.
The first was the agency‘s general inability to provide adequate postapproval
monitoring of drugs and act against potential hazards. The second was the
agency‘s failure to appreciate its own limitations, combined with its adoption
of a counterproductive new stance supporting preemption without justifying its
change in view. The first form of agency failure was more overtly identified in
the majority opinion, yet the second was likely as much of a driving force.
What the second failure revealed was an unreliable and potentially captured
agency, whose rules and understanding of its own actions were not grounded in
agency expertise and therefore did not merit deference. In fact, some members
of the Court may have perceived a third, more specific agency failure at issue
in the case, namely the FDA‘s failure to prohibit IV push administration of
Phenergan. The majority opinion did not criticize the FDA on this front, but
Justices Alito and Ginsburg both questioned the FDA‘s decision at oral
argument.115
Similar concerns with agency performance are evident to some degree in
Altria. Altria also made reference to a resource-strapped agency unable to
fulfill its responsibilities without state assistance: ―The FTC has long
depended on cooperative state regulation to achieve its mission because,
although one of the smallest administrative agencies, it is charged with
policing an enormous amount of activity.‖116 The majority also characterized
the FTC‘s stance as one of ―inaction‖ and ―agency nonenforcement of a federal
statute‖ in allowing continued use of the Cambridge Filter Method.117 This
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1202–03.
114. Id. at 1202 n.11. A law review article cited by the Wyeth Court argues that the FDA‘s
view was based on ―an unrealistic assessment of the agency‘s practical ability—once it has
approved the marketing of a drug—to detect unforeseen adverse effects of the drug and to take
prompt and effective remedial action.‖ David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical
Examination of the FDA‘s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 Geo. L.J. 461, 465
(2008); see also Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202-03 & n.12 (citing Kessler & Vladeck).
115. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249) (Alito,
J.) (―[H]ow could the FDA [have] concluded that IV push was safe and effective when on the
benefit side of this you don‘t have a life-saving drug, you have a drug that relieves nausea, and on
the risk side you have a risk of gangrene?‖); id. at 7 (Ginsburg, J.) (―[T]he risk of gangrene and
amputation is there. No matter what benefit there was, how could the benefit outweigh that
substantial risk?‖).
116. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 545 n.6 (2008).
117. Id. at 550–51.
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characterization was more generous to the FTC than describing it as
affirmatively allowing reliance on a faulty test method, and the Court also
emphasized that the FTC‘s inaction resulted in part from the fact that tobacco
companies did not provide test results demonstrating the Filter Method‘s
inadequacies.118 The Court further noted that the FTC itself ―disavowe[d] any
policy authorizing the use of ‗light‘ or ‗low tar‘ descriptors,‖ and the agency‘s
occasional efforts to ―police cigarette companies‘ misleading results of test
results.‖119 Thus, the treatment of the FTC is more positive than that which
the FDA received in Wyeth—perhaps in part due to the fact that the FTC,
unlike the FDA, opposed preemption.120 Nonetheless, Altria is similar to
Wyeth in portraying the FTC as unable to fulfill its statutory mandate and as
having been inactive in the face of potential risks.
Federal agency failure loomed particularly large in the background of
Cuomo, with the OCC repeatedly characterized as an agency captured by the
entities it was charged with regulating, the classic example of agency
failure.121 Notably, the Court did not invoke these allegations or in other ways
expressly criticize the agency‘s overall performance as it did in Wyeth.
Moreover, the Court insisted that its decision in no way called into question its
decision two years earlier in Watters, in which the Court had ruled in favor of
preemption, notwithstanding strong allegations of OCC failure.122
118. Id. at 551 n.14 (arguing ―FTC‘s inaction . . . [was] in part the result of petitioners‘
failure to disclose‖ evidence of testing inaccuracy).
119. Id. at 549–50.
120. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14–16,
Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538 (No. 07-562) (arguing Respondents‘ claims not preempted by FTC
regulations); see also Sharkey, Product Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 471–77
(emphasizing importance of agency‘s position on preemption in understanding results in
preemption cases).
121. See, e.g., Brief for the States of North Carolina et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 33–39, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass‘n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) (No. 08-453)
(arguing ―[t]he OCC‘s self-interest in protecting its constituent banks . . . apparently is driving the
OCC‘s position on visitorial powers‖); id. at 37 (―The OCC has a ‗strong incentive‘ to persuade
major banks to retain or convert to national charters because the OCC‘s budget is almost entirely
funded by fees paid by national banks.‖ (quoting Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC‘s Preemption
Rules Exceed the Agency‘s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System
and Consumer Protection, 23 Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 225, 276 (2004))); Wilmarth,
Supreme Court Responds, supra note 104, at 19–25 (―In response to the OCC‘s preemption
campaign, several large, multistate banks converted from state to national charters, thereby
producing a significant increase in the OCC‘s assessment revenues.‖); see also Thomas W.
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1039, 1050–52 (1997)
[hereinafter Merrill, Capture Theory] (describing theory of agency capture and its centrality as
―pathology of agency government‖).
122. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2717 (distinguishing Watters); see also Brief Amici Curiae of
AARP et al. in Support of Petitioner, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (No.
05-1342), 2006 WL 2570989 at *11–14 (identifying OCC‘s regulatory failures and

self-interest in preempting state regulation). The holding in Watters was
subsequently statutorily overruled by the Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, §§ 1044(a), 1046, 124 Stat. 1376, 2014–15, 2017–18 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1465, 5136C(b)) (providing that application of state law to national bank
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Nonetheless, Cuomo still contains its share of allusions to deficient
federal regulation. The majority insisted that preemption of state law
enforcement would render state law de facto ineffectual, arguing that ―[t]he
bark remains, but the bite does not.‖123 Implicit in this characterization is a
rejection of the possibility that the OCC could be relied upon to enforce state
law where applicable.124 The majority also repeatedly cast the OCC as
overreaching and ―attempt[ing] to do what Congress declined to do: Exempt
national banks from all state banking laws, or at least state enforcement of
those laws.‖125 On this framing, the OCC appears as an agency that has
fundamentally misunderstood the regulatory regime it is charged with
enforcing and that has sought, by administrative fiat, to exempt national banks
from longstanding legal constraints. Cuomo‘s portrayal is also interesting
because it implicitly recognizes that federal overregulation can be a form of
federal agency failure—albeit in this case, the federal overregulation was
aimed at limiting the regulatory oversight applied to national banks. Although
Cuomo does not explicitly tie preservation of state enforcement to improved
OCC regulation, its characterization of federal banking regulation as involving
a ―mixed state/federal regime[],‖ as in Wyeth, similarly underscores the
importance of state enforcement to effective implementation of the overall
federal regulatory scheme.126 Preserving room for state enforcement thus
ensured that the OCC would not be able to undermine the fundamental
congressional choice of a dual national-state bank regulatory system.
This consistent theme of agency failures—be they failures of funding,
performance, or reasoning—is notable. It marks a striking departure from
previous preemption precedent, which at times portrayed agencies as carefully
wielding their expertise to achieve the appropriate balance between state and
federal regulation.127 Even before the Court‘s most recent decisions, however,
occasional suggestions of greater judicial skepticism of agencies had appeared
subsidiary or affiliate is not preempted).
123. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2718.
124. See id. at 2718 n.3 (leaving open question of ―whether converting the Comptroller‘s
visitorial power to assure compliance with all applicable laws . . . into an obligation to ensure
compliance with certain state laws,‖ as Congress did in Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, sufficed to preempt state enforcement of state law).
125. Id. at 2720; see also id. at 2715 (characterizing OCC regulation as ―expansive‖); id. at
2717 (stating ―[t]here is not a credible argument‖ supporting equation of visitorial powers and
law enforcement, as OCC‘s regulation does).
126. Id. at 2718, 2720–21.
127. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 317–18 (2008) (characterizing
FDA‘s premarket approval process as ―rigorous‖ and documenting extensive data collected and
time spent by FDA); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 863, 883 (2000) (―The
agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulations and its objectives . . . .‖);
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 110 (2000) (―[E]ven in the context of a regulation related to
local waters, a federal official with an overview of all possible ramifications of a particular
requirement might be in the best position to balance all the competing interests.‖); Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) (―[T]he agency is uniquely qualified to determine whether a
particular form of state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress . . . .‖ (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).
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in preemption decisions. The Court‘s sharply contested 2006 decision in
Gonzales v. Oregon is a prime example; there, the majority refused to defer to
the Attorney General‘s interpretation of his own regulation, citing among other
factors his lack of expertise and his failure to consult outside of his own
department.128 Such growing skepticism may have several roots, but an
important likely contributing factor is the federal agencies‘ dramatic shift to
advocating for broad preemption during the Bush Administration.129 This
phenomenon, highlighted by amicus briefs in preemption cases and public
debate, prompted increasing criticism of federal agencies as captured by
regulated interests and as basing their decisions on ideology rather than
expertise.130 These complaints resonated with the Court outside of the
preemption context as well; Massachusetts v. EPA paints a picture of
unreasoned and flawed agency reasoning quite similar to that offered in Wyeth,
Cuomo, and Gonzales.131 Also in the larger background were allegations of
high-profile regulatory failures, such as the FDA‘s delay in acting on Vioxx
and other popular drugs found to pose unexpected postapproval risks, or the
failure of financial regulators (including the OCC) to act on subprime
mortgage abuses by national banks.132 The mortgage crisis is particularly
relevant because that represented a context in which state attorneys general and

128. 546 U.S. 243, 268–69, 274–75 (2006); see also id. at 257 (―An agency does not acquire
special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to
formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.‖).
Additionally, in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007), the majority avoided
discussing the agency‘s view and any deference due it altogether, opting instead to engage in a
fairly expansive reading of statutory text to find preemption plainly required. See Metzger, New
Federalism, supra note 27, at 2042–45 (describing and critiquing reasoning in Watters); see also
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 328–29 (critiquing agency‘s reasoning in interpreting its own regulations with
respect to preemption as ―less than compelling‖).
129. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing propreemption shift and resulting
scholarly outcry).
130. See, e.g., Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2032–35 (discussing Attorney
General Ashcroft‘s implementation of Controlled Substances Act); Sharkey, Preemption by
Preamble, supra note 3, at 237–42 (discussing FDA); Wilmarth, Supreme Court Responds, supra
note 104, at 19–21, 24 (discussing OCC).
131. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (―EPA has offered no reasoned
explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate
change.‖); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 85 (―There is [in Massachusetts] a conclusory assertion that EPA‘s
nonscientific ‗policy judgments‘ do not ‗amount to a reasoned justification for declining to form a
scientific judgment‘ . . . .‖ (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533–34)); Metzger, New
Federalism, supra note 27, at 2059 (―Massachusetts . . . repeatedly criticized the EPA . . . .‖).
132. See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 114, at 480 (―[T]he FDA acknowledges that it took
over a year to force Merck, the manufacturer of Vioxx, to add a warning of the risks of heart
attack and stroke to Vioxx‘s label.‖); Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter,
Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41
Conn. L. Rev. 1327, 1351–56 (2009) (discussing regulatory lapses by OCC and Office of Thrift
Supervision in relation to subprime mortgage crisis); Nagareda, supra note 28, at 43 (noting
―widespread criticism of the FDA in connection with the controversy over the safety of
prescription pain drugs,‖ including Vioxx).
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other state officials were far more active than federal regulators in policing
fraud, prompting efforts by the OCC to restrict state intervention.133
Focusing on agency failure also helps explain why federalism surfaces to
the extent it does in the decisions. The decisions identify state law as a
mechanism to guard against federal agency failure, and federalism
presumptions represent an important analytical tool for ensuring that state law
is preserved. Critically, however, federalism is invoked more as a means to
improve federal agency performance than as a value in its own right.134 Put
differently, federalism here means preserving state authority because of its
benefits for national administration, not because of constitutional recognition
of states as quasi-independent sovereigns or general systemic gains from
having states serve as laboratories of experiment. Interestingly, this account of
state law as a tool for policing and improving federal administration also
explains why the decisions might preserve only a relatively limited state
enforcement role. Robust authority to construct and pursue independent
policies is less important when states are functioning as federal regulatory
adjuncts rather than as more autonomous sovereigns. Indeed, more directed
and active state regulation could complicate the tasks facing federal agencies
by expanding the occasions of federal-state conflict.
Other scholars similarly have emphasized the extent to which poor federal
administrative performance led the Court to resist preemption in these
decisions. Arthur Wilmarth, for example, argues that Cuomo‘s rejection of
preemption is best explained by the subprime mortgage crisis and the Court‘s
concern ―that the OCC‘s preemption rules and regulatory failings contributed
to the severity‖ of that crisis.135 David Vladeck has long contended that the
FDA‘s regulatory failures, particularly in postapproval monitoring of drugs
and medical devices, strongly counseled against preemption of failure-to-warn
suits.136 On these accounts, state law helps avoid the regulatory gaps and
uncompensated harms that poor federal regulation otherwise could create.137
In addition, Catherine Sharkey has noted the reforming effect that Wyeth may
133. See Wilmarth, Supreme Court Responds, supra note 104, at 3, 19–21, 26 (arguing that
states took greater efforts to address predatory lending and faulting federal regulatory oversight).
134. As a result, the preemption decisions represent a twist on the relationship between
federalism and administrative law, evident in other recent precedent. As I have discussed
elsewhere, of late the Court has increasingly used administrative law to protect state interests
against undue federal intrusion. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2063–69; supra
note 69 and accompanying text. The preemption decisions similarly present a close intermingling
of administrative law and federalism concerns, but the underlying dynamic between these two is
reversed: Here federalism is serving more to meet administrative law concerns than the other
way round.
135. Wilmarth, Supreme Court Responds, supra note 104, at 2, 31.
136. See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 114, at 484–95 (emphasizing resource and
information constraints on FDA); see also Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure Risks, in
Preemption Choice, supra note 3, at 56–58 (identifying capture, information deficiencies, and
limited resources as problems causing federal regulatory failure more generally).
137. See Vladeck, supra note 136, at 56 (describing ―safety net of tort litigation‖ to fill
―gaps that regulatory agencies cannot fill‖); Wilmarth, Supreme Court Responds, supra note 104,
at 3 (calling states ―far more proactive‖ than federal agencies in protecting consumers).
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have on agency preemption determinations, encouraging agencies to use
notice-and-comment rulemaking and create a sufficient agency record in
support.138 Less highlighted has been the extent to which the decisions portray
state law as playing an important role in reforming and improving federal
regulation more broadly. Writing before the recent decisions, however,
Richard Nagareda and others emphasized the potential of using preemption to
improve regulation by fostering greater information disclosure to the FDA.139
In like vein, David Barron has argued limited preemption helps protect against
excessive federal agency politicization,140 and Amy Widman has defended
state enforcement of federal regulations as a check on federal enforcement
inaction.141
2. Dominance of ―Tort as Regulation‖ over ―Tort as Compensation.‖—
Agency failure‘s centrality to the Court‘s reasoning is also demonstrated by the
decisions‘ treatment of individual compensation. Concern with preserving
injured individuals‘ access to compensation has featured prominently in many
of the Court‘s prior decisions rejecting tort preemption claims.142 This
consideration was notably lacking in the recent preemption decisions, where
compensation concerns were expressly identified only in Wyeth and invoked
there somewhat obliquely.143 Even more striking is the extent to which Wyeth

138. See Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 66, at 2179–80, 2186–89.
139. See Nagareda, supra note 28, at 40–49; see also Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 114, at
491–95 (noting, in course of discussing failure-to-warn litigation‘s effectiveness in producing
information of product risk, instances in which FDA responded to such information disclosures);
Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 519–20 (emphasizing greater
information disclosure to FDA as benefit of limiting preemption to instances in which FDA has
made determination on precise risk at issue). But see Schuck, supra note 28, at 99–100
(questioning information gains to FDA from litigation).
140. See David J. Barron, Foreword: From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Adminsitrative
Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1095, 1097–98 (2008)
(―[D]ecentralization is most definitely responsive to the concerns raised by politicization . . . .‖).
141. See Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through a
Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers—A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and
Improvement Act of 2008, 29 Yale L. & Pol‘y Rev. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 4–6, 31–
37) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (portraying state enforcement as central to ensuring
protection of state interests in federal administration and identifying such an approach as in
keeping with federalism concerns of Cuomo); see also Lemos, supra note 108 (manuscript at 13–
32) (discussing, from federalism perspective, benefits of such state enforcement).
142. See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 466–71 (discussing
Court‘s treatment of tort law as compensatory in preemption decisions).
143. The Court noted that ―Congress did not provide a federal remedy for consumers
harmed by unsafe or ineffective drugs‖ in the original FDCA or subsequent amendments, from
which the Court inferred Congress had ―determined that widely available state rights of action
provided appropriate relief for injured consumers.‖ Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1199
(2009). Underlying this conclusion was the assumption that Congress would not have left injured
consumers without some avenue of relief. On other occasions, however, the Court has made this
point expressly, stating ―[i]f Congress had intended to deprive injured parties of a long available
form of compensation, it surely would have expressed that intent more clearly.‖ Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005); accord Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238, 251 (1984) (finding it implausible that ―Congress would, without comment, remove all
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portrayed individual compensation less as a goal in its own right and more as
simply a mechanism that can assist federal regulators by encouraging
disclosure. According to the Court, ―[s]tate tort suits . . . serve a distinct
compensatory function that may motivate injured persons to come forward
with information.‖144 Put differently, state tort liability helps federal
regulators identify where to target their regulatory efforts, thereby helping to
ensure that potential hazards do not escape federal regulatory scrutiny. More
generally, the decisions portray tort liability primarily in regulatory terms.
This is again most evident in Wyeth, which repeatedly invoked the incentive
effects of tort liability, such as its statement that Congress ―may . . . have
recognized that state-law remedies further consumer protection by motivating
manufacturers to produce safe and effective drugs and to give adequate
warnings.‖145
Such a regulatory account of tort law has surfaced previously in the
Court‘s preemption decisions,146 but it usually did so in decisions finding
preemption.147
The dominance of the regulatory tort model here,
notwithstanding the failure of claims for preemption, underscores the extent to
which improving federal regulation and federal agency performance lie at the
decisions‘ analytic core. Interestingly, Wyeth left unstated a seemingly more
direct and obvious connection between agency failure and individual
compensation: the point that poor agency performance increases the likelihood
of injured individuals and thus intensifies the importance of state tort law‘s
compensatory function. One reason the Court may not have drawn this linkage
is because doing so might seem to call into question specific agency regulatory
decisions, such as the FDA‘s decision to allow IV injection of Phenergan. But
that this connection went unmentioned again reinforces the strongly regulatory

means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct‖). But see Riegel v. Medtronic,
Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 326 (2008) (finding congressional intent to deny judicial recourse obvious
because ―this is exactly what a pre-emption clause for medical devices does by its terms‖).
144. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202.
145. Id. at 1199–200; see also id. at 1202 (―State tort suits . . . provide incentives for drug
manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly.‖).
146. This regulatory view of tort law was particularly evident in Riegel‘s statement that
―[s]tate tort law that requires a manufacturer‘s catheters to be safer, but hence less effective, than
the model the FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme no less than [a] state regulatory law
to the same effect.‖ Riegel, 552 U.S. at 325.
147. Catherine Sharkey has made this point particularly well, identifying two distinct
understandings of tort law in the Court‘s tort preemption precedent—one emphasizing the
regulatory role of tort and the other its corrective justice or compensatory function—and noting
the correlation of the latter with decisions rejecting preemption claims. See Sharkey, Products
Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 459. These two alternative views in preemption precedent
parallel two alternative theories of the function tort law plays in the academic literature:
regulatory accounts and tort as corrective justice. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Tort
Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1501, 1508–09 (2009)
(identifying scholars falling into both ―camps‖); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law:
Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1801, 1801, 1802–11 (1997)
(describing ―two major camps‖ as those who ―understand[] tort liability as an instrument aimed
largely at the goal of deterrence‖ and those who ―look[] at tort law as a way of achieving
corrective justice between the parties‖).
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rather than compensatory view of tort law evident in the majority opinion.
Additional evidence that improving regulatory outcomes is the decisions‘
prime concern comes from the Court‘s failure to emphasize the intersection
between securing individual compensation and respecting federalism
principles. One of the most problematic aspects of administrative preemption
of tort law is that the agencies themselves lack the ability to create alternative
compensatory mechanisms.148 Any public insurance fund, such as the
programs used to assist 9/11 and vaccine victims, must be created by
Congress.149 Agencies also lack the ability to provide for private rights of
action not authorized by Congress in a governing statute.150 From an
individual compensation perspective, therefore, an important reason to require
that preemption decisions be made by Congress is that doing so may increase
the chances that preemption will be tied to some alternative means for securing
compensation.151
Requiring congressional action is also—and more
commonly—justified on federalism grounds, as mandated by our federalist
constitutional structure.152 As a result, the individual compensation and
structural federalism perspectives dovetail in seeking clear congressional
authorization of preemption. Federalism and individual compensation would
seem closely interwoven in Wyeth and Altria in any event, given that the
traditional state function at issue in both is precisely that of preserving injured
individuals‘ access to compensation.153 Yet the Court made little of these
148. See Schuck, supra note 28, at 93, 100–01 & n.114 (―The principal structural limitation
of FDA regulation, [for example], is that it cannot directly compensate victims . . . .‖).
149. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (―No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .‖); see also September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 401, 115 Stat. 230, 237 (creating public
insurance fund); National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 2110,
100 Stat. 3755, 3758 (same).
150. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (―Like substantive federal law itself,
private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.‖).
151. See McGarity, supra note 3, at 47 (―Until quite recently . . . Congress never expressly
preempted state common law without providing an alternative route to corrective justice by
creating either a separate federal cause of action or an alternative administrative compensation
regime.‖); Klass, supra note 147, at 1537–40 (noting shift in 1990s whereby Congress was not
providing ―a federal substitute when it decide[d] to eliminate state tort lawsuits‖).
152. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down:
Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 Duke L.J. 2111, 2116 (2008)
(―[C]onstitutionalism means that we are simply not free to choose whatever normative principles
and institutional strategies we think best.‖); Bhagwat, supra note 26, at 225–26, 228–29
(―[E]fficiency is beside the point. The Constitution preserves state authority even when it is
inefficient . . . .‖); Clark, supra note 22, at 1427–30 (―The Supreme Court‘s long-standing
presumption against preemption . . . functions to ensure that Congress . . . makes the crucial
decision to displace state law‖ and such decisions ―ensure[] that only actors subject to the
political safeguards of federalism adopt ‗the supreme Law of the Land.‘‖).
153. For an argument that preserving tort remedies is particularly important from a
federalism perspective, see Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Access to Courts and
Preemption of State Remedies in Collective Action Perspective 1, 8, 19, 26 (Mar. 17, 2009)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=robert_glicksman (on file
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connections between preserving individual compensation and federalism,
focusing instead on the ways that individual compensation and state liability
each separately serve to improve federal regulation.
II. CONFLICTING JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO ALLEGED AGENCY FAILURE
On this account, the preemption decisions are significantly about federal
administration. They represent an effort by the Court to harness the power of
state law and judicial preemption analysis to police and improve federal
agency performance. Federalism and individual compensation concerns are
also present, but they play a more ancillary or secondary role. Instead, what is
really driving the analysis is fear of agency failure.
Viewed in this light, however, the decisions appear in some tension with
at least some of the Court‘s preemption and administrative law precedent. The
Court has previously rejected state efforts to tie tort liability to the quality of
federal administrative decisionmaking. It had also consistently resisted—
including in a decision issued just one day before Wyeth—efforts to use the
courts to address claims of general agency failure. The discussion below
begins by describing the Court‘s precedent holding state law claims alleging
fraud on a federal agency preempted, and next describes the Court‘s rejection
of legal challenges targeting broad agency policy or performance. It then
attempts to explain this divergence between the preemption decisions and other
precedent addressing claims of agency failure. Because the Court itself never
acknowledges this divergence, efforts to make sense of it are a hazardous
enterprise. One factor that appears particularly salient, however, is that in the
preemption decisions state law and preemption analysis target federal
administration indirectly rather than directly.
A. Buckman and Fraud-on-the-Agency Claims
Concerns about federal agency failure are not new to the preemption
context. But in the past the Court has shown far less receptivity to the idea of
using state law to improve federal agency performance. The 2001 case of
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee involved claims that a
manufacturer of orthopedic bone screws had made fraudulent representations
to the FDA to obtain FDA approval for the devices.154 The claims were
brought as state law actions for fraud against the consulting company that had
helped the manufacturer obtain FDA approval. The Court ruled such ―fraudon-the FDA‖ claims were impliedly preempted, stating:
[T]he federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish
and deter fraud against the Administration, and . . . this authority is
used by the Administration to achieve a somewhat delicate balance
of statutory objectives. The balance sought by the Administration
can be skewed by allowing fraud-on the-FDA claims under state tort
with the Columbia Law Review).
154. 531 U.S. 341, 343 (2001).
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law.155
According to the Court, the possibility of fraud-on-the-FDA liability
might discourage manufacturers from seeking FDA approval for products or
lead them ―to submit a deluge of information that the Administration neither
wants nor needs.‖156 Seven Justices held that, as a result, ―[s]tate-law fraudon-the-FDA claims inevitably conflict with . . . the Administration‘s judgment
and objectives‖ and were categorically preempted.157 Concurring in the
judgment, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that preemption
was appropriate here but rejected the majority‘s categorical ban. In his view,
―[i]f the FDA determines both that fraud has occurred and that such fraud
requires removal of a product from the market, state damages remedies would
not encroach upon, but rather would . . . facilitate, the federal enforcement
scheme.‖158
Three features of Buckman stand in particular contrast to Wyeth. First is
the impressive consensus among the Justices; whereas Wyeth was closely
contested, Buckman was unanimous in concluding that preemption was
warranted. Second is Buckman‘s portrayal of the FDA. Rather than Wyeth‘s
underresourced agency unable to obtain the information it needs to monitor the
multitude of drugs and devices on the market, Buckman viewed the FDA as a
sophisticated and expert regulator that carefully balances conflicting goals and
structures its processes to obtain the optimal amount of information.159 Third,
and most relevant to my purposes here, is Buckman‘s resistance to state law
playing a role in federal administration. Buckman described the relationship
between a federal agency and the entity it regulates as ―inherently federal in
character‖ and insisted that the state fraud claims at issue arose ―solely from
the violation of FDCA requirements.‖160
This perception of federal
administration and state law as inherently distinct is a basic assumption driving
the Court‘s analysis. It underlay Buckman‘s rejection of a presumption against
preemption, because ―[p]olicing fraud against federal agencies is hardly ‗a
field which the States have traditionally occupied.‘‖161 It also explains the
disagreement between the majority and the concurrence; whereas the
concurrence was willing to countenance state law fraud enforcement
conditioned on an FDA determination that fraud had occurred, the majority
was unwilling to allow states even that role. Instead, in the Buckman
155. Id. at 348. For a discussion of the Court‘s greater willingness to allow fraud-on-theagency claims in the patent context, see Louis M. Bograd & Andre M. Mura, Buckman Stops
Here! Limits on Preemption of State Tort Claims Involving Allegations of Fraud on the PTO or
the FDA, 41 Rutgers L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 36–43), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1532841 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
156. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350–51.
157. Id. at 350–53.
158. Id. at 354 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
159. Id. at 350–51 (majority opinion).
160. Id. at 347, 352–53.
161. Id. at 347 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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majority‘s portrayal, state fraud-on-the-FDA claims represented an illegitimate
state effort to interfere in a purely federal realm—the enforcement of federal
law by the federal agency to which Congress had delegated enforcement
responsibility.
Buckman‘s insistence that the fraud claims involved there depended
exclusively on federal law, as opposed to ―traditional state tort law which had
predated the federal enactments in questions [sic],‖162 left open the question
whether any state tort law referencing a manufacturer‘s fraudulent actions visà-vis the FDA would be preempted, or only state actions that sought to impose
liability for such fraud. This question arose in Desiano v. Warner-Lambert &
Co.,163 a Second Circuit decision addressing a Michigan statute that granted
immunity from product liability actions for drugs approved by the FDA and in
compliance with FDA requirements but denied such immunity when the drug‘s
manufacturer withheld or misrepresented required information and the FDA
would not have approved the drug had it possessed complete and accurate
information.164 The Second Circuit held that Michigan‘s immunity exception
was not preempted under Buckman because claims allowed as a result of the
exception were ―premised on traditional duties between a product
manufacturer and Michigan consumers‖ and therefore not ―based solely on the
wrong of defrauding the FDA.‖165 The Sixth Circuit meanwhile took a
different view of Michigan‘s statute, concluding that the immunity exception
was impliedly preempted under Buckman to the extent its application was
based on a state court finding of fraud on the FDA, rather than a finding of
fraud by the FDA itself.166
The Court granted certiorari to resolve this conflict but in the end simply
affirmed the Second Circuit by an evenly divided vote, with Chief Justice
Roberts recused.167 The much closer vote than in Buckman is notable, though
it is impossible to tell whether that stemmed from the different claims in the
two cases or instead reflected some Justices‘ changing views on Buckman.168

162. Id. at 353.
163. 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006).
164. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2946(5) (West 2000).
165. Desiano, 467 F.3d at 94–96; see also id. at 94 (arguing presumption against preemption
applied here because, unlike Buckman, Michigan was not ―attempt[ing] to police fraud against the
FDA‖ but instead simply ―to regulate and restrict when victims could continue to recover under
preexisting state products liability law‖).
166. Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Catherine
M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 841, 850–55 (2008)
[hereinafter Sharkey, Fraud Caveat] (discussing Desiano, Garcia, and related precedent and
arguing for Garcia approach). For other views on Desiano and Garcia, compare Nagareda, supra
note 28, at 46–47 (supporting Desiano approach), with Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must
Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda,
J. Tort L., Dec. 2006, at 13–14 (criticizing Desiano).
167. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S. 440 (2008) (mem.) (per curiam).
168. Lower courts‘ continued inconsistency on these issues may lead the Court to revisit this
question. Compare In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d 156, 177 (1st
Cir. 2009) (distinguishing Buckman and finding no preemption because suit did not involve
―misrepresentations made directly to HCFA‖ and that ―[a]t issue here is a state law remedy for
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The contrasts between Buckman and Wyeth suggest that to some extent such
change may be occurring. Significantly, however, the failure-to-warn claims
in Wyeth did not take issue with the FDA‘s approval of Phenergan,169 and thus
Wyeth does not necessarily signal that the Court has changed its view on state
tort claims based on allegations of fraud against federal agencies.
B. Administrative Law Challenges to Agency Failure
Wyeth‘s emphasis on how state liability can improve the FDA‘s
performance is also at odds with administrative law precedent rejecting efforts
to challenge general agency functioning. These cases are based exclusively in
federal law, such as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or substantive
federal statutes, and they involve claims that an agency is pursuing policies or
programmatic approaches at odds with governing requirements.170 The Court
has been extremely reluctant to entertain such challenges, invoking standing,
ripeness, and APA jurisdictional requirements as barriers to judicial
involvement.171
A prime example is Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, a 1990
decision in which the Court rejected an environmental organization‘s effort to
challenge the Bureau of Land Management‘s (BLM) program for determining
when public lands could be opened up for additional uses such as mining.172
By a 5-4 vote, the Court insisted that the organization could not challenge the
agency‘s general approach to making such determinations; instead, it was
limited to targeting final BLM decisions to open up specific lands, and only

deceptive practices by a manufacturer against its customers‖), with Pa. Emps. Benefit Trust Fund
v. Zeneca, Inc., 499 F.3d 239, 251 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding state law claims preempted by FDA
regulations although ―the FDCA is not as clearly a ‗critical element‘‖ as in Buckman), vacated,
129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009) (mem.).
169. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009) (―[T]he jury verdict established only
that Phenergan‘s warning was insufficient. . . . We therefore need not decide whether a state rule
proscribing [Phenergan‘s] intravenous administration would be pre-empted.‖).
170. Although my focus here is on challenges to federal agency action, for analogous
decisions rejecting challenges to state or local policies on constitutional grounds, see, e.g., City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (denying standing to challenge police use of
choke holds); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (deeming district court injunction on
municipal police department overbroad and, regardless, finding lack of justiciable case or
controversy).
171. This reluctance has developed over time. In the 1960s and early 1970s, fears of agency
capture fueled expansions in standing and development of more rigorous doctrines of judicial
review. Although those decisions remain good law, over the ensuing decades the Court has
demonstrated far greater skepticism about the appropriateness of using the courts as a mechanism
to address broad agency failure. See Merrill, Capture Theory, supra note 121, at 1039–44, 1059–
67 (―Starting in the late 1960s, many federal judges became convinced that agencies were prone
to capture and related defects and—more importantly—that they were in a position to do
something about it.‖); id. at 1073–74 (noting literature and ―today‘s general climate‖ evidence
―deep skepticism about all government institutions, combined with very little sense that judges
have any tools that allow them to do something about it‖).
172. 497 U.S. 871, 875, 900 (1990).
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then when the organization could show those decisions had an immediate or
actual effect on the organization‘s members.173 Noting the organization‘s
claim that violation of governing statutory requirements was ―rampant‖ in the
land review program, Justice Scalia‘s majority opinion responded: ―Perhaps
so. But respondent cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by
court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of
Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally made.‖174
The latest manifestation of this resistance to suits targeting general agency
policies or performance came in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, a decision
issued just the day before Wyeth.175 Summers involved a challenge brought by
environmental organizations to the Forest Service‘s policy, embodied in an
agency regulation, of excluding certain limited timber sales from the notice,
comment, and appeals processes statutorily mandated for Forest Service
projects.176 The Court dismissed the challenge, again in a 5-4 decision with
Justice Scalia writing for the majority, underscoring that the organizations had
settled their claims with respect to the one specific project they had identified.
According to the Court, absent an identifiable project they were challenging,
the organizations could not establish sufficient actual and imminent injury to
satisfy constitutional standing requirements.177
This is all standard standing fare, and the result in Summers is of a piece
with existing precedent.178 To be sure, standing analysis is notoriously
malleable, and the Court has at times found standing to challenge agency
failure to comply with governing statutes despite complaints that the plaintiffs
asserted only a generalized grievance and lacked the type of specific and

173. Id. at 889, 891–93.
174. Id. at 891.
175. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009). In Summers, the Court denied
standing to an environmental group and its members that sought to challenge the Forest Service‘s
acknowledged policy of exempting certain fire timber sales from statutorily required procedures.
Id. at 1151.
176. Id. at 1147–48.
177. Id. at 1149–51.
178. See Jonathan H. Adler, Standing Still in the Roberts Court 18 (Case Research Paper
Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 09-32, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1497037 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (―The Court may appear to have taken a slight step back from Massachusetts‘ permissive
approach to standing in Summers . . . .‖). Summers does help resolve debates over standing to sue
on procedural violations. For instance, of the requirements laid out for notice-and-comment
rulemaking in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006), the Court stated that ―deprivation of a procedural
right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—a procedural right in
vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III standing.‖ Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1151. But, as in its
1992 Lujan decision, the result seems to turn on parsing a terse concurrence by Justice Kennedy.
See Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Summers is also important to the question of
when the possibility of harm to some of an organization‘s members is sufficiently great to support
organizational standing. See generally Bradford Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects
Probabilistic Standing, but a ―Realistic Threat‖ of Harm Is a Better Standing Test, 40 Envtl. L. 89
(2010) (discussing this aspect of Summers).
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individualized injury the Constitution requires.179 However, the Court has
been more consistent—and sometimes unanimous—in rejecting attempts to
target general policies or programmatic approaches guiding federal
administration, limiting its involvement to instances in which a specific agency
decision is at issue.180 Underlying these decisions, including those which turn
on an interpretation of the jurisdictional requirements of the APA, are
separation of powers concerns about the appropriate limits on federal court
oversight of governmental administration. According to the Court, ―broad
programmatic attack[s]‖ inappropriately ―inject[] . . . [courts] into day-to-day
agency management‖ and risk ―judicial entanglement in abstract policy
disagreements which courts lack both expertise and information to resolve.‖181
For similar reasons, the Court also has been reluctant to entertain challenges to
agency inaction and agency delay, holding even challenges to specific agency
nonenforcement decisions presumptively nonreviewable.182
One seeming outlier from this line of cases is the Court‘s 2007 decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA. There, the Court held that Massachusetts had standing
to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency‘s (EPA‘s) refusal to
regulate greenhouse gases as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act (CAA).183
In so concluding, the Court put particular emphasis on Massachusetts‘s status
as ―a sovereign State,‖ noting that ―[w]hen a State enters the Union, it
179. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522, 524–525 (2007) (holding potential
injury from climate change suffices for standing to challenge federal agency‘s failure to regulate
new auto emissions, notwithstanding ―climate-change risks are ‗widely shared‘‖ and fact that
such emissions are only one contributor to global warming); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25
(1998) (rejecting claim that informational harm to voters from federal agency‘s nonenforcement
of election law was too generalized to support standing because shared by all voters).
180. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64, 66–67, 71–72 (2004)
(refusing to entertain ―broad programmatic attack‖ on agency); Ohio Forestry Ass‘n v. Sierra
Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732–37 (1998) (finding agency decision not ripe for review).
181. Norton, 542 U.S. at 64, 66–67; see also Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1148 (stating ―courts
have no charter to review and revise legislative and executive action‖ except when part of their
―traditional role of . . . redress[ing] or prevent[ing] actual or imminently threatened injury to
persons caused by private or official violation of law‖).
182. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (―This Court has recognized on
several occasions over many years that an agency‘s decision not to prosecute or enforce . . . is a
decision generally committed to an agency‘s absolute discretion.‖); see also Massachusetts, 549
U.S. at 527 (distinguishing denial of rulemaking petitions from other forms of agency inaction).
Summers itself did not go so far as that; instead, the majority acknowledged that the organizations
could have standing to challenge the Forest Service‘s failure to provide an opportunity for notice,
comment, or appeal in conjunction with a specific project. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1151. Yet the
majority erected a very high evidentiary burden for standing to be found, requiring the
organizations to identify not only specific timber salvage sales exempt from such procedures
under the Forest Service‘s regulation, but also specific plans by particular members to use
precisely those small parcels of the national forests where the sales would occur. Id. at 1150–53.
For a discussion of the Court‘s precedent rejecting challenges to the general manner in which
agencies operate and its approach to agency inaction more broadly, see Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1657, 1664–
75, 1705–11 (2004).
183. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516–26.
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surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives‖ to the federal government.184 That
transfer of authority, combined with Congress ―ha[ving] ordered EPA to
protect Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing [air pollutant] standards‖
and having provided a procedural right to challenge EPA‘s rulemaking denial,
meant that Massachusetts was ―entitled to special solicitude in our standing
analysis.‖185 The Court supported its invocation of a special role for the states
with citations to its parens patriae jurisprudence, under which the Court has
long upheld the ability of a state to sue asserting ―quasi-sovereign‖ interests,
which include a state‘s ―interests in the health and well-being of its residents‖
and ―in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful place within the federal
system.‖186 But the Court not only offered little clarification of how exactly
Massachusetts‘s status as a state factored into its ability to sue, it also
proceeded to argue that Massachusetts had standing in terms typical of those
used for private parties as well, such as the fact that Massachusetts owned
substantial coastal property that could be affected by rising sea levels.187
In any event, Massachusetts differed from other administrative law
decisions in this line by targeting a specific agency action: denial of a
rulemaking petition. The Court itself emphasized this feature in finding the
case justiciable.188 Thus, although Massachusetts stands out as a relatively
rare challenge to agency nonenforcement, the Court did not treat the decision
as an exception to its prohibition on broad challenges to agency policy and
performance.189
This administrative law precedent rejecting broad challenges to agency
policy and performance might appear at first glance to have little in common
with Wyeth and the recent preemption decisions. Most notably, the Summers
line of cases are fundamentally about separation of powers and the role of the
federal courts in overseeing the functioning of federal agencies. Federalism
does not factor into these cases which, other than Massachusetts, do not
involve the states or state law claims at all. Yet a central issue underlies and

184. Id. at 518–19.
185. Id. at 519–20.
186. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602–09
(1982) (describing development of parens patriae doctrine).
187. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521–23; Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at
2037–39 & n.51, 2062–63 (discussing traditional standing elements and potential ―special
solicitude‖ for Massachusetts); see also Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing
Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA‘s New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 1701, 1746–47 (2008) [hereinafter Mank, States Standing](arguing
Massachusetts does not provide clear test for state standing); Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J.
Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues Other than Global
Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1029, 1030–31 (2008) (noting Massachusetts v. EPA‘s ―somewhat
unusual‖ approach to standing that ―blended the conventional Lujan analysis‖ with ―standing
analysis [based] on the state‘s sovereign interest at stake in the litigation‖).
188. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516 (―Congress has moreover authorized this type of
challenge to EPA action.‖).
189. See id. at 527–28 (distinguishing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) and noting
―[t]here are key differences between a denial of a petition for rulemaking and an agency‘s
decision not to initiate an enforcement action‖).
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links these seemingly disparate areas of jurisprudence. That issue is how the
courts should respond to the potential for poor administrative performance and
failure of federal agencies to fulfill their statutory responsibilities.
Moreover, Summers and the preemption decisions took notably different
stances on this issue, albeit through different doctrinal rubrics that forestall any
direct conflict. In Summers, the Court portrayed the claim that the Forest
Service was failing to adhere to governing statutes as fundamentally off limits
to judicial review because it was framed as a challenge to the agency‘s general
policy, divorced from any concrete application.190 The impact that largely
precluding judicial review would have on agency decisionmaking—good or
ill—was irrelevant and not discussed.191 By contrast, in the preemption
decisions the Court invoked factors undermining general agency performance,
such as insufficient resources and informational disadvantages, as centrally
relevant considerations in assessing the strength of preemption claims.192 The
Court did not demand evidence that these factors had played a role in
producing the specific agency decisions at issue—the FTC‘s position on the
Cambridge Filter Method, the FDA‘s approval of Phenergan, or the OCC‘s
regulation construing visitorial powers to include state law enforcement.
Equally divergent was the Court‘s focus on the incentive effects of state law
liability and its willingness—expressly in Wyeth, more tacitly in Altria and
Cuomo—to strategically employ judicial proceedings to improve the overall
quality of federal agency decisionmaking. Left wholly unexplained is why, if
policing general federal agency performance represents an illegitimate
overstepping of the judicial role, the courts can consider general agency
performance when determining whether state law should be deemed
preempted.
To be sure, Altria, Wyeth, and Cuomo are individuated in precisely the
way the Court found lacking in Summers, thereby forestalling any issue of
satisfying Article III jurisdictional requirements. This is characteristic of
preemption challenges generally; they emerge from discrete contexts involving
allegedly conflicting federal and state law and thus involve a limited group of
potential plaintiffs. Such individuation is particularly pronounced when
preemption claims arise in conjunction with tort suits, which often involve
specific injured plaintiffs. At the same time, preemption determinations
frequently have a systemic flavor, because they require consideration of the
overall relationship of federal and state law in a given regulatory context.
Such overall assessments are particularly characteristic of implied preemption
claims, which, as Justice Thomas protested, by their nature look beyond the

190. See supra note 177; see also supra text accompanying notes 180–181 (discussing
Court‘s consistent rejection of broad attack on agencies‘ general policies or programmatic
approaches).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 175–180.
192. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 (2009) (―The FDA has limited
resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market . . . .‖).
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text of the federal statute.193 Further, the Court‘s insistence that preemption is
a question traditionally left for judicial resolution may help alleviate any
separation of powers concerns that the courts are overstepping their
constitutional role in considering systemic aspects of federal regulation in this
context.194
Although the simultaneously individuated and systemic character of
preemption analysis no doubt contributed to the Court‘s greater willingness to
address overall agency performance in the preemption decisions than in
Summers, this feature does not fully explain the Court‘s different stance.
Summers‘s denial of standing seems more the result of the Court‘s reluctance
to police overall federal agency functioning than the other way around,195 and
it is precisely the lack of a similar reluctance in the preemption decisions that
requires explanation. Moreover, a broad view of federal agency performance
necessarily downplays the details of specific cases and focuses instead on the
general features of a regulatory scheme. This dynamic is strikingly present in
Wyeth, in the majority‘s unwillingness to delve into the particulars of the
FDA‘s assessment of Phenergan‘s risk (particulars emphasized at length by the
dissent) at the same time as it underscored the general information gains that
state liability could bring.196 In addition, even if preemption claims require
some broader assessment of the nature of the federal regulatory scheme, they
surely do not necessitate consideration of whether in practice the federal
agency will be able to fulfill its statutory responsibilities. And the more the
Court seeks to use preemption to influence how federal agencies function, the
more it would seem to be impinging upon agency programmatic choices and
enforcement discretion, which National Wildlife Federation and similar
193. See id. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring) (―I have become increasingly skeptical of this
Court‘s ‗purposes and objectives‘ pre-emption jurisprudence . . . [in which] the Court routinely
invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives,
legislative history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not embodied within
the text of federal law.‖).
194. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2094–96 (defending subconstituional
enforcement of federalism values as properly within judicial power).
195. Significantly, the agency‘s policy was codified in a governing regulation, and the
plaintiffs had submitted additional affidavits after settling their claims with respect to the specific
project previously at issue that the Court refused to consider. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
129 S. Ct. 1142, 1147 (2009) (―[A]mendments to the Forest Service‘s manual of implementing
procedures . . . provided that fire-rehabilitation activities on areas of less than 4,200 acres, and
salvage-timber sales of 250 acres or less, did not cause a significant environmental impact and
thus would be categorically exempt from the requirement to file an EIS or EA.‖ (citing National
Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Cire Management Activities, 68 Fed. Reg.
33,815, 33,824 (June 5, 2003); National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for
Limited Timber Harvest, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,598, 44,607 (July 29, 2003))); id. at 1153 (rejecting
dissent‘s argument that Court ―should also have considered the late-filed affidavits‖). To be sure,
the plaintiffs may have trouble demonstrating standing going forward, but that is because the
Court is applying a very high threshold for showing standing in this context, see supra note 182,
which appears to reflect the determination of a majority of Justices that this type of challenge
does not belong in court.
196. Compare Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1198–99 (emphasizing Vermont courts rejected Wyeth‘s
suggestion that FDA intended to prevent strengthening of Phenergan‘s label), with id. at 1222–27
(Alito, J., dissenting) (detailing Wyeth‘s interactions with FDA over Phenergan‘s label).

40

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW - FORTHCOMING

decisions insist should be left to the political branches to control.197 In any
event, neither the individuated nor systemic aspects of preemption analysis
help clarify the contrast between the Court‘s approach in Wyeth and its
position in Buckman—also a preemption decision and thus sharing these
individuated and systemic features.
C. Direct Versus Indirect Efforts at Agency Reform
Put simply, the Court was far more willing to address overall agency
failure and to try to improve agency performance in the recent preemption
decisions than it was in Buckman or its administrative law precedent. The
puzzle is how to explain this difference. The Court itself offers no
clarification. Plainly, an important factor is shifting majorities and the
idiosyncratic preferences of swing Justices; the four Justices in dissent in
Summers were in the majority in Wyeth, Altria, and Cuomo.198 Other
contextual differences have been considered above.199 But is there anything
else about the preemption decisions that might justify the Court‘s varied
responses?
One notable difference is that none of the state claims or laws at issue in
the recent preemption decisions directly targeted federal agency
decisionmaking.200 Instead, they affected federal regulation and federal
agency performance indirectly—whether by influencing the behavior of
regulated entities, supplementing federal oversight efforts, or compensating for
failures in federal enforcement. As Catherine Sharkey has noted, this is true
even of Wyeth, which involved a general state failure-to-warn claim that did
not take issue with any FDA decision.201 Although the Court undertook to
review the FDA‘s position on the preemptive effect of drug labeling decisions,
it did so only to determine what weight to assign to the agency‘s position in the
Court‘s own independent assessment of preemption. As a result, the Court‘s
conclusion that the agency‘s view on drug labeling preemption was
procedurally and substantively unsound simply meant that the Court ignored
197. See Lujan v. Nat‘l Wildlife Fed‘n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990); see also sources cited
supra note 180 (demonstrating Court‘s aversion to challenges to agency programmatic choices).
198. Justices Scalia and Kennedy switch positions among these cases; Justice Scalia wrote
the majority opinions in Cuomo and Summers but dissented in the other two preemption cases,
whereas Justice Kennedy joined the majority in Altria, Wyeth, and Summers but dissented in
Cuomo. As noted above, the split summary affirmance in Desiano may also suggest some
movement away from Buckman.
199. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (discussing statutory interpretation
contingencies and mapping Justices‘ voting in these cases).
200. As Part III below makes clear, I ultimately conclude that such a direct-indirect
distinction fails to justify the Court‘s differential treatment of these lines of decision.
201. See Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 66, at 2185–88 (underscoring
indirect aspect of Wyeth and viewing it as creating possibility for indirect challenges to agency
rulemaking and other administrative decisionmaking); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187,
1201 (2009) (―We are faced with no . . . regulation in this case, but rather with an agency‘s mere
assertion that state law is an obstacle to achieving its statutory objectives.‖).
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the agency‘s view, rather than vacating or remanding the drug labeling
regulation in which this view was put forward. Similarly, the Court did not
directly question the FDA‘s approval of Phenergan‘s label, but instead
emphasized the limited scope of this approval.202 Although Wyeth was
centrally concerned with improving the FDA‘s performance, the Court limited
itself to indirect techniques by which to achieve this goal, such as fostering
greater information disclosure or using deference as a carrot to incentivize
better agency assessments of state law‘s impact on federal regulation.
Altria and Cuomo were similarly indirect in their policing of federal
agency action. Rather than directly challenging the FTC‘s inaction on the
Cambridge Filter Method, Altria supplemented the FTC‘s failed oversight with
a potentially powerful state law incentive to offer more accurate assessments of
tar and nicotine yields.203 The OCC‘s regulation interpreting the NBA as
preempting state law enforcement efforts was directly at issue in Cuomo, and
the decision rendered that provision in the OCC‘s regulation essentially
void.204 Again, however, the state law actions authorized in Cuomo were not
state law challenges to OCC regulatory decisions, but instead enforcement
actions against national banks. To the extent Cuomo serves to improve federal
bank regulation, it will be by protecting against regulatory gaps resulting from
OCC nonenforcement with state law enforcement, not by directly overturning
any specific OCC decisions.205
The indirect aspect of the preemption decisions was not emphasized by
the Court. Nonetheless, it is a significant feature of these decisions—and of
preemption challenges generally. Such challenges typically arise, as in Altria
and Wyeth, out of disputes between two private parties rather than a suit
against the federal government, with state and federal law intersecting only in
their application to the same private conduct.206 Cases occur in which the
federal government is a party, such as Cuomo, but they are rare.207 Even when
202. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194, 1196–99.
203. Cf. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 544 (2008) (―[N]either [of the Act‘s
purposes] would be served by limiting the States‘ authority to prohibit deceptive statements in
cigarette advertising.‖).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48.
205. Although the state banking laws at issue in Cuomo directly applied to national banks,
the Court has long denied that their status as federally chartered corporations and federal
instrumentalities entitles them to any particular exemption from state law. See First Nat‘l Bank v.
Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924) (―[N]ational banks are subject to the laws of a State in respect
of their affairs . . . .‖).
206. See Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal
Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 Yale L.J. 2195, 2218 (2003) (―In
most preemption cases, the federal and state governments do not confront each other directly.‖);
cf. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1220 (3d ed. 2000) (―[T]he federal-state
interaction has been indirect: the question has been how to allocate constitutional power as
between the two levels of government when each seeks to deal with the same area of private
conduct.‖).
207. An ongoing prominent example of such involvement is the federal government‘s suit to
have Arizona‘s new immigration law declared preempted. See United States v. Arizona, No. CV
10-1413-PHX-SRB, 2010 WL 2926157 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2010). Of course, the government
often participates in preemption challenges before the Court as amicus curiae. See Sharkey,
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the federal government is a party, it is still usually affected indirectly through
the impact of state law on the behavior of federally regulated entities, rather
than head-on.208 Indeed, this indirect aspect might be thought especially true
of preemption challenges involving state tort law, given that tort law itself
operates indirectly. As the Court stated in distinguishing between a jury
verdict and a legal requirement: ―A requirement is a rule of law that must be
obeyed‖; a jury verdict is ―an event . . . that merely motivates an optional
decision . . . . [W]hether a jury verdict will prompt the manufacturer to take
any particular action‖ is a matter of speculation.209
Equally important, the indirect character of these decisions offers a
possible ground on which to distinguish the Court‘s precedent that is resistant
to efforts to police agency performance. In particular, the state law claim in
Buckman targeted federal agency decisionmaking more directly than most state
tort claims and preemption litigation. The only basis offered for liability was
the company‘s interactions with the FDA, and a finding of liability necessarily
would have called the FDA‘s approval of the bone screws into question. This
direct targeting of the FDA‘s decision was emphasized most in the
concurrence, which concluded that the suit was preempted because the FDA
had done nothing to remove the bone screws from the market. According to
the concurrence, an FDA determination that ―fraud has occurred and that such
fraud requires the removal of a product from the market‖ was necessary to
establish the causality element of the fraud claim ―without second-guessing the
[agency‘s] decisionmaking or overburdening its personnel.‖210 The majority,
by contrast, focused primarily on the impact that such fraud claims would have
on the FDA by dint of their effects on regulated parties‘ behavior.211 Yet
concerns about immediate effects on the FDA, such as the danger that
regulated parties would deluge the FDA with unhelpful information, also
surface in the majority opinion, leading it to insist that fraud-on-agency claims
would have a ―direct impact on the United States.‖212 Also revealing is the
Buckman majority‘s insistence that the fraud claims were not independently
based in state law and instead represented an effort to enforce the disclosure
requirements of the FDCA. The majority repeatedly underscored that this
enforcement task was statutorily assigned to the FDA, thus portraying fraud-

Products Liability Preemption, supra note 26, at 471 & n.103 (noting outcome of preemption
challenges frequently tracks position adopted by Solicitor General).
208. See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 114, at 476 (―Failure-to-warn litigation does not
undercut [the FDA‘s] authority. Failure-to-warn litigation challenges the company‘s failure to
warn doctors and patients about a risk and seeks money damages for injuries caused by the lack
of an adequate warning. Plaintiffs do not seek injunctions . . . .‖).
209. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 445 (2005); see also Klass, supra note
147, at 1567–75 (faulting Court for ―implicitly classifying all tort law as public law‖).
210. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs‘ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353–54 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
211. Id. at 350–51 (majority opinion).
212. Id. at 351 n.6.
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on-the-FDA claims as directly interfering with the agency‘s regulatory role.213
Administrative law challenges operate still more directly on federal
agencies. Sustaining such a challenge generally results in vacatur of an agency
decision and a remand to the agency for further action—or potentially in
outright reversal when a court concludes the agency was acting outside of its
authority.214 Even when an agency retains substantial discretion on remand, it
cannot continue with its chosen course of action without responding to the
court in some fashion. The direct aspect of administrative law challenges is
evident in Summers. The claim there was brought directly against the Forest
Service, through its officers, and the lower court‘s decision sustaining the
environmental organizations‘ challenge had resulted in a nationwide injunction
against the Forest Service‘s timber salvage regulation.215 Moreover, at issue
was not a substantive requirement governing the behavior of third parties, but
instead a question of the procedures that the Forest Service itself was required
to follow in making forest management decisions.216
In addition, a distinction between direct and indirect efforts at agency
reform has considerable intuitive appeal from both a federalism and a
separation of powers perspective. Direct state targeting of federal agency
action through state law brings to the fore concerns about states overstepping
their constitutional role and undermining the efficacy and supremacy of the
federal government.217 Such fears of improper state involvement in federal
affairs seem to animate Buckman.218 The danger of improper state
interference in federal regulation appears mitigated when state law operates

213. Id. at 348–50 & n.4.
214. 3 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 18.1, at 1675 (5th ed. 2010).
The option of remand without vacatur is an important administrative law development, but does
not alter the basic proposition here that agencies must respond to a reviewing court‘s decision or
face outright reversal, whether sooner or later.
215. See Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 690–91 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming
nationwide injunction against two regulations and remanding on ripeness grounds as to
regulations not applied to proposed project); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct.
1142, 1153 (2009) (―Since we have resolved this case on the ground of standing, we need not
reach . . . the question whether, if respondents prevailed, a nationwide injunction would be
appropriate.‖).
216. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1149. Similarly, the suit in National Wildlife Federation was
brought directly against the Secretary of the Interior, the Director of BLM, and the Interior
Department; NWF sought to force the agency to change its approach to assessing whether public
lands could be opened for additional uses and to invalidate specific agency decisions reclassifying
particular lands. Nat‘l Wildlife Fed‘n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 272–73 (D.D.C. 1985).
217. Even state suits targeting federal action under federal law have occasionally provoked
such a reaction, although such suits are now well accepted. See infra text accompanying notes
268–272 (discussing evolution toward acceptance).
218. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350 (―State-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims inevitably conflict
with the FDA‘s responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Administration‘s judgment and
objectives.‖); id. (―As a practical matter, complying with the FDA‘s detailed regulatory regime in
the shadow of 50 States‘ tort regimes will dramatically increase the burdens facing potential
applicants—burdens not contemplated by Congress in enacting the FDCA and the MDA.‖); see
also Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing danger of state
interference in federal administration as ―inter-branch-meddling concerns‖).

44

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW - FORTHCOMING

wholly independently of federal law and without directly targeting federal
agencies.219 In such contexts, the states‘ claims of sovereignty also appear at
their strongest; they are acting within their traditional spheres rather than
reaching out to insert themselves into purely federal arenas. Indeed, states as
indirect instigators of federal agency reform maps well on a standard account
of federalism‘s benefits, under which states serve as laboratories of
experimentation devising new regulatory strategies from which federal
agencies—and other states—can learn if they choose. This indirect character
also lends state law a less intrusive air: Wyeth, though acknowledging state
law can have an impact, casts it not as displacing federal agency discretion but
instead as affecting agency behavior around the edges.220
The appearance of not stepping directly into the policy domains of the
executive branch also helps explain why a Court that had just handed down
Summers did not feel the same separation of powers concerns about assessing
how state law claims could improve overall federal agency performance in
Wyeth. Direct challenges that seek to change broad policy or overall aspects of
agency performance seem to risk far greater intrusion on agencies‘ operations
and the policysetting prerogatives of the political branches. Although Wyeth
holds important lessons for the FDA about how to proceed if it wants to
influence future preemption determinations, the agency remains free to ignore
these lessons if it so chooses. Not so in the Summers context, where sustaining
the challenge at issue would have forced the Forest Service to change its
approach to salvage fire sales.
III. THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN REFORMING FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION
In sum, the fact that the state laws involved in the preemption decisions
did not directly target federal agency decisionmaking appears to be an
important ingredient in the Court‘s willingness to consider overall
administrative performance in its analysis. Again, the Court itself does not
distinguish between direct and indirect efforts at federal agency reform, so this
account entails some reading between the lines. But such a distinction helps
resolve the tension between the preemption decisions and other instances in
which the Court has rejected both state and federal law efforts to police federal
agency performance. The distinction also appears to resonate with federalism
principles, and thus accords with the Court‘s evident linkage of federalism and
agency failure concerns in the preemption decisions.
Despite its attractiveness, however, a distinction between direct and
indirect efforts at federal agency reform is ultimately unsatisfying, at least if it
is posited as a categorical matter. As I argue below, the impact of indirect

219. See Richard S. Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 Yale
L.J. 1385, 1394 (1964) (collecting cases supporting state court jurisdiction in areas involving ―no
direct interference with or obstruction of federal functions‖).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 201–202 (discussing Wyeth).
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reform measures on federal agencies can be very significant in practice, and it
can be quite difficult to separate measures that directly target federal agencies
from those that do so only indirectly. Moreover, efforts by states to directly
regulate federal agencies and officials are not necessarily at odds with our
constitutional structure. Indeed, once federal and state authority is recognized
to be largely concurrent, states can have quite legitimate reasons for directly
targeting federal agency decisionmaking. In fact, state efforts to directly
challenge poor federal agency performance, albeit under federal law and in
federal courts, may better accord with constitutional federalism principles than
more indirect reform efforts.
The failure of the direct-indirect distinction to ultimately justify the
Court‘s divergent case law suggests a more radical possibility: Perhaps Wyeth
and the preemption decisions should be read as assigning the states a special
role in policing federal administration across the board, through both direct and
indirect measures. Such an approach offers intriguing possibilities as a
mechanism for further development of federalist principles within our
contemporary national administrative state. This view of the decisions would
represent a more significant reorientation of the Court‘s jurisprudence,
however. More importantly, much analytic work needs to be done to clarify
what such a state role would mean in practice and to justify why the courts,
rather than Congress, should be the ones to assign the states special
responsibilities for monitoring federal administration.
A. The Failure of Functional and Formalist Justifications of the DirectIndirect Distinction
As described above, the appeal of the direct-indirect distinction is
twofold: Indirect state efforts at federal agency reform appear less intrusive
and more reflective of the proper relationship between federal and state
governments—and between agencies and the federal courts—than efforts that
directly challenge agency performance.221 On greater scrutiny, however, these
functional and formalist justifications of the direct-indirect distinction prove
unavailing.
1. Functional Limitations of a Direct-Indirect Distinction.—Perhaps the
most obvious critique of a distinction between direct and indirect efforts at
agency reform is that the perception of indirect measures as unobtrusive is
often quite clearly mistaken. In practice, indirect measures can have as great
(or greater) an impact on agency functioning and discretion than direct reform
efforts.
This critique, in fact, underlies arguments for broad implied
administrative preemption, such as those made by the FDA in Wyeth and
espoused by the Wyeth dissent. Under that view, state law liability seriously
impairs the FDA‘s efforts to create an optimal regulatory regime because it
leads regulated entities to take greater precautions than the agency believes
221. See supra text accompanying notes 217-219.
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appropriate.222 The Wyeth majority downplayed such an impact, rejecting the
proposition that FDA approvals represent a careful and up-to-date calibration
of the various risks involved in the thousands of drugs the agency oversees.223
It is not necessary, however, to accept that proposition to conclude that the
majority nonetheless paints an overly rosy account of Wyeth‘s impact on the
FDA.224 What the majority ignores is the high likelihood that drug
manufacturers may try to inoculate themselves against future liability by
getting the FDA to reject alternative warnings.225 To put the point in
Buckman‘s terms, manufacturers now have ―an incentive to submit a deluge of
information‖ on possible risks and to push for an agency response rejecting
label changes.226 The result could well be substantial burdens on an already
underresourced and overtaxed agency.227 Even a move seemingly quite
222. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1218 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (―[T]he real
issue is whether a state tort jury can countermand the FDA‘s considered judgment that
Phenergan‘s FDA-mandated warning label renders its . . . use ‗safe.‘‖); see also Schuck, supra
note 28, at 78 (―The conflicting standards between state courts (and juries) and the federal
agencies create inconsistent incentives for manufacturers.‖).
223. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200–04.
224. For contrasting views of the FDA‘s performance in this regard, compare Kessler &
Vladeck, supra note 114, at 483 (―[W]e . . . have reservations about the FDA‘s preemption
position because it depends on the proposition that the FDA is capable of policing the
marketplace effectively on its own.‖), with Schuck, supra note 28, at 91, 113 (arguing that, in its
drug safety decisions, ―the FDA exercises an authority that is probably more comprehensive and
technocratically rigorous than that exercised by any other federal regulator,‖ although also
acknowledging information and resource disadvantages that hamper FDA). Recent reports on the
FDA‘s failures to monitor drugs adequately post-approval support Kessler & Vladeck‘s more
skeptical view. See Subcomm. on Sci. & Tech., FDA Sci. Bd., FDA Science and Mission at Risk
2, 6 (2007) (―[T]he Agency suffers from serious scientific deficiencies and is not positioned to
meet current or emerging regulatory responsibilities.‖); U.S. Gov‘t Accountability Office, GAO06-402, Drug Safety: Improvement Needed in FDA‘s Postmarket Decision-making and
Oversight Process 5 (2006) (reporting management deficiency in postmarketing oversight);
Comm. on the Assessment of the U.S. Drug Safety Sys., Inst. of Med. of the Nat‘l Acads., The
Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public 193–94 (2007)
(reporting general lack of resources preventing effective postmarketing drug safety); see also
Citizens Advisory Comm. on the Food & Drug Admin., Report to the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, H.R. Doc. No. 84-227, at 53 (1st Sess. 1955) (reporting on budgetary and
staffing deficiencies). For similar criticisms of the FDA‘s preapproval review, see, e.g., Reed
Abelson, Quickly Vetted, Treatment Is Offered to Cancer Patients, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2008, at
A1; Barry Meier, F.D.A. Seeks Better Data from Tests of Devices, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 2009, at
B1.
225. Cf. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 66, at 2186, 2189 (characterizing
Wyeth as consistent with agency reference model under which agencies should be required ―to
provide . . . comprehensive, written responses‖ to applications by drug manufacturers to change
their labels, and arguing that ―drug manufacturers, and other interested parties, should be able to
challenge . . . refusals by the agency to create the necessary agency record‖ in order to ―preserve
their ability to mount a preemption defense‖).
226. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs‘ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 351 (2001).
227. This situation might eventually inure to the agency‘s benefit, insofar as it gains useful
information or its inability to respond leads the pharmaceutical industry to lobby for increases in
the FDA‘s budget. See Schuck, supra note 28, at 108 (noting Professor Merrill‘s speculation that
―the industry . . . might press Congress to provide more resources to enable the agency to respond
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deferential to agency decisionmaking, such as allowing state law fraud-on-theagency claims to go forward only when the agency itself concludes that fraud
occurred, could prove to have a substantial impact on agency functioning. The
possibility of such liability seems likely to lead manufacturers to fight FDA
fraud determinations vigorously and to result in the agency imposing weaker
penalties.228 The Arizona district court recently underscored this point in a
decision that held much of Arizona‘s new immigration law preempted.
Although the law did not target federal immigration administration directly, the
court concluded it would prove too burdensome on federal administration
because it would lead to ―an increase in the number of requests for
determinations of immigration status, . . . [and thus] divert resources from the
federal government‘s other responsibilities and priorities.‖229
That indirect regulatory approaches are powerful is, of course, not a novel
point. To the contrary, it underlies much modern regulatory design, such as
efforts to rely on market-based regulation rather than top-down, commandand-control approaches.230 Indeed, the effectiveness of indirect approaches is
heralded by the view of tort in regulatory rather than compensatory terms, as
well as by Wyeth itself, which defends continued state law liability for
inadequate drug labels in large part because of its indirect beneficial impact on
federal regulation.231

to [its] requests‖). But that potential outcome only underscores the impact preemption can have
as an indirect tool for influencing behavior. See, e.g., Hills, Against Preemption, supra note 24, at
22 (―By giving nonfederal lawmakers a wider scope for entrepreneurial activity, a clear statement
rule against federal preemption increases their capacity to influence congressional agendas in
dramatic ways.‖).
228. Some commentators already fault the FDA for its limited fraud enforcement efforts.
See Derrick Price, FDCA Medical Device Amendments and Federal Preemption: Putting the
Screws to Spinal Fusion Patients, 3 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol‘y 83, 105–07 (2002) (describing
criticisms of FDA enforcement efforts); see also Thomas O. McGarity, Beyond Buckman:
Wrongful Manipulation of the Regulatory Process in the Law of Torts, 41 Washburn L.J. 549,
563–70 (2002) (describing impediments to aggressive agency fraud enforcement). Commentators
advocating this approach to the Desiano and Buckman situations largely have not discussed the
potential impact subsequent tort liability could have on agency fraud determinations. See, e.g.,
Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2004) (failing to discuss this
dynamic); Sharkey, Fraud Caveat, supra note 166, at 850, 864–66 (same).
229. United States v. Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB, 2010 WL 2926157, at *11 (D.
Ariz. July 28, 2010).
230. A current example is the proposal to regulate greenhouse gases through federal
legislation creating a cap-and-trade system. See William W. Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas
Regulation, Federal Climate Change Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, 1 San Diego J.
Climate & Energy L. 23, 26–28 (2009) [hereinafter Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas Regulation]
(describing proposal); see also Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 263–71 (1982)
(criticizing command-and-control environmental regulation).
231. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1199–200 (2009) (―[Congress] may also have
recognized that state-law remedies further consumer protection by motivating manufacturers to
produce safe and effective drugs and to give adequate warnings.‖). Another recent example of
the powerful indirect effect of preemption determinations comes in the context of greenhouse gas
regulation, where decisions rejecting preemption claims against state nuisance suits are an
important force behind growing industry acceptance of new federal regulation. See Buzbee, State
Greenhouse Gas Regulation, supra note 230, at 35 (―Polluters . . . see federal law as a means to
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Further, direct regulatory approaches can be structured so that regulated
entities retain substantial discretion over their actions. Performance-based
regulation, which imposes outcome measures that regulated parties must meet
but allows flexibility in how they do so, is a prime example.232 Perhaps more
analogous to the agency reform efforts at issue here, direct legal relief intended
to address widespread failure in the operations of government institutions can
be structured to preserve substantial discretion on the part of the institutions
involved.233 So, too, some direct challenges to general agency policies present
less risk of intruding on agency prerogatives than others. Summers, for
example, involved a relatively narrow question of statutory interpretation about
which the agency had affirmatively adopted a position through notice-andcomment rulemaking. Although a decision against the agency would force it
to comply with procedural requirements, resolution of such a challenge seems
less likely to tread on legitimate agency operational discretion than one that
challenges ―[g]eneral deficiencies in compliance‖ with a statutory mandate.234
Equally important, no clear divide separates state measures that affect
federal agencies directly from those that do so indirectly. Instead, an array of
potential approaches exists with many measures blending both indirect and
direct elements. This situation is most clearly illuminated by state statutes
addressing tort liability for pharmaceutical products. A number of states have
adopted statutory immunity measures that preclude liability to some degree for
drugs approved by the FDA, provided the drug manufacturer complied with all
regulations.235 ―Without exception, all of these state statutes contain a fraud
exception, disabling immunity where the drug manufacturer has deceived or
defrauded the FDA.‖236 Michigan‘s statute providing total immunity subject

undercut or preempt outright state and local law as well as common law litigation directed at
climate change and its many contributing sources.‖); see also Connecticut. v. Am. Elec. Power
Co., 582 F.3d 309, 369 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding city and private plaintiffs had standing to bring
public nuisance cause of action against defendant polluters).
232. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Performance-Based Regulation: Enterprise Responsibility
for Reducing Death, Injury, and Disease Caused by Consumer Products, 34 J. Health Pol. Pol‘y &
L. 1035, 1072 (2009) (―Performance-based regulation ties together the freedom to sell products
with the responsibility for resulting negative consequences, leaving it to the firms to tailor the
former in ways that minimize the latter.‖).
233. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabalization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1019 (2004) (describing ―experimentalist
regulation‖ and noting that ―[t]ypically, the regime leaves the parties with a substantial range of
discretion as to how to achieve the[] goals‖ of the regulation).
234. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 66 (2004).
235. See Sharkey, Fraud Caveat, supra note 166, at 850 (detailing different types of
measures adopted by thirteen states); see also Pa. Emps. Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 499
F.3d 239, 242–47 (3d Cir. 2007) (analyzing exemption in Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, Del.
Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2513(b) (2005), which states that ―[t]his section shall not apply . . . [t]o any
advertisement or merchandising practice which is subject to and complies with the rules and
regulations, of[,] and the statutes administered by, the Federal Trade Commission‖), vacated, 129
S. Ct. 1578 (2009) (mem.).
236. Sharkey, Fraud Caveat, supra note 166, at 850.
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to such a fraud exception was the statute at issue in Desiano.237
Are such measures best understood as directly targeting the FDA‘s
processes or as independent measures focused on determining the scope of
state law immunity that take the FDA‘s processes into account only indirectly?
The most accurate answer would appear to be both; the direct-indirect
distinction simply does not map well here. Perhaps for that reason, the
scholarly commentary on the fraud exception does not tend to consider this
distinction pivotal. Instead, general agreement exists on the need to provide
some exception for fraud as the price of preemption or immunity, in large part
to support FDA regulation and ensure that the beneficial information
disclosing effects of tort liability are preserved.238 Put differently, the fact that
states are to some degree directly targeting FDA decisionmaking through these
measures is not thought necessarily problematic. Indeed, some proposals to
mitigate the impact of such fraud exemptions on the FDA would do so by
making the exemption‘s availability turn even more directly on the FDA‘s
actions, specifically on whether the FDA itself has determined that fraud has
occurred.239
Similar mixed indirect and direct approaches exist in other contexts. One
example is state greenhouse gas measures that expressly seek to spur federal
action but also independently govern emissions within state borders.240
Another is state legislation that aims to take advantage of federal allowance for
independent state law requirements that parallel those applicable under federal
law. In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, for example, the Court emphasized that
preemption under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act

237. See supra text accompanying notes 163–168.
238. See Schuck, supra note 28, at 83 (―Like all other tort scholars, I favor an exception to
both FDA preemption of tort claims and to any state law regulatory compliance defense that
might survive this preemption . . . .‖); Sharkey, Fraud Caveat, supra note 166, at 841 (―What I
term the ‗fraud caveat‘ to federal agency preemption has great intuitive appeal.‖); Nagareda,
supra note 28, at 46–47 (―[A] showing of . . . fraud [on the FDA] should suffice to defeat the
preemptive effect that a given FDA assessment of a device or drug might otherwise have . . . .‖).
239. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs‘ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (―The fact that the [FDA] has done nothing to remove the devices from the market,
even though it is aware of the basis for the fraud allegations, convinces me that this essential
element of the claim cannot be proved.‖); Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 966 (6th
Cir. 2004) (following Justice Stevens‘s approach of allowing liability when FDA has determined
fraud has occurred); Sharkey, Fraud Caveat, supra note 166, at 848–55 (calling Justice Stevens‘s
approach a ―promising compromise‖). Peter Schuck would seek to limit the exception‘s scope by
instead imposing high proof burdens. See Schuck, supra note 28, at 86 (noting that in his
proposed exception ―in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the tort plaintiff would have to meet
a pleading standard requiring greater specificity with respect to both the allegations of disclosure
deficit and supporting the factual evidence‖).
240. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Change and the Environmental Impact Review
Process, Nat. Resources & Env‘t, Winter 2008, at 20, 20 (―So far, as in most aspects of this issue,
the states have been ahead of the federal government in considering climate change and are
developing procedures that may be applied more broadly if a more sympathetic presidential
administration comes into office.‖); see also J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of
Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1500 (2007)
(discussing effect of state climate change initiatives on federal legislation).
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(FIFRA) would not apply to state causes of action that were substantially
equivalent to FIFRA‘s because the statute limited preemption to state
requirements that were ―in addition to or different from those required under
[federal law].‖241 States seeking to avoid preemption thus would seem well
advised to directly model their tort law and regulatory enactments on the
requirements imposed by federal agencies, thereby once again blurring the line
between state measures that directly target federal agency action and
independent state law. That blurring is evident even in the context of
administrative law challenges. Although such challenges—for example, the
claim that an agency action was arbitrary and capricious—unquestionably
involve direct agency targeting, in many ways their real power over time has
stemmed more from their indirect impact on how agencies function in general
than it has from their direct effect on the specific regulatory decision at
issue.242
2. Formal Constitutional Limits on State Efforts to Directly Target
Federal Agencies and Federal Officials.—Viewed practically, therefore, the
direct-indirect distinction has little to commend it; the distinction does not
accurately identify more intrusive reform efforts and is likely to prove difficult
to implement consistently. A harder question, however, is whether formal
constitutional principles nonetheless require such a distinction.
In assessing this argument, I want to focus only on the federalism
dimension and leave to the side the contention that direct federal judicial
efforts to reform federal agencies violate separation of powers requirements.
As a general principle, the latter proposition is unsustainable. The federal
courts regularly undertake direct review of federal agency action, pursuant to
congressional instructions, and since Marbury have asserted power to enforce
constitutional requirements on other branches of federal government.243

241. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005). For the provision of
FIFRA at issue, see 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006). The FDCA contains similar language. See 21
U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006) (allowing preemption for state statutes which are ―different from, or in
addition to‖ federal law).
242. See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale L.J.
38, 60 (1975) (―The effect of [thorough circuit court of appeals] judicial opinions within the
agency reaches beyond those who were concerned with the specific regulations reviewed. They
serve as a precedent for future rule-writers and give those who care about well-documented and
well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever with which to move those who do not.‖); Mark Seidenfeld,
Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 Admin. L.
Rev. 429, 458–59 (1999) (―[T]here are indications that ex-post review helps curb documented
abuses of the regulatory system.‖). Even critics of arbitrary and capricious review would seem to
agree. The dominant complaint that such review ossifies rulemaking emphasizes the broader
impact such challenges have on agencies and the incentives they create for agencies to act
through other routes. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety 9–26
(1990) (describing National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration‘s change in regulatory
strategy from rulemaking to recalls and identifying obstacles the legal system imposes on
rulemaking as important culprit behind shift).
243. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (―It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.‖).
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Summers is simply the last (as of this writing) in a long line of decisions
acknowledging that such judicial scrutiny is appropriate so long as Article III‘s
requirements are met.244 The claim underlying the Summers line is instead
that judicial efforts at wholesale agency reform go beyond the courts‘
constitutional role and infringe on powers assigned to Congress and the
President under Articles I and II.245 But more importantly here, if direct
judicial efforts at broad agency reform are at odds with separation of powers,
then judicial attempts to achieve that result indirectly would appear to be
equally constitutionally suspect—particularly given the potential impact of
indirect reform efforts on agency discretion. From a separation of powers
perspective, therefore, the direct-indirect distinction has little formal bite.
From a federalism perspective, however, the situation initially appears
quite different. Some indirect state impact on federal agencies and federal
regulation is inevitable given overlapping federal and state regulatory
authority. At a minimum, such concurrent authority means federal agencies
need to regulate with an eye to the states to ensure that federal policies do not
interact with state requirements in unintended and undesired ways. State
regulatory actions may also lead federal agencies to change their policies and
enforcement activities—whether by showcasing more effective strategies and
the existence of federal regulatory gaps, or by prompting federal agencies to
defend their turf.246 As the Court has remarked, the indirect impact of state
law on federal agencies ―is but the normal incident of the organization within
the same territory of two governments.‖247
By contrast, state law that directly targets federal agencies and officers
seems to fit uncomfortably with our formal constitutional federalist structure,
in particular the principle of federal supremacy. Such targeting raises the
danger that ―the operations of the general government may at any time be

244. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148–49 (2009) (noting courts
have authority to ―review and revise legislative and executive action‖ only when necessary ―to
redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by private or official
violation of law‖). Indeed, a case could be made that judicial review is a constitutional
imperative of broad agency delegations. See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as
Constitutional Common Law, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 479, 522 (2010) (―The Court has made clear
that broad congressional delegations of authority to administrative agencies are constitutional, but
it has failed to adequately consider whether such delegations should come with constitutional
strings attached.‖).
245. See sources cited supra notes 180, 197 (documenting Summers line of cases). Similar
concerns with excessively broad judicial remedies surface in cases in which the federal courts
have mandated at times quite sweeping changes in state and local agencies to cure violations of
constitutional and federal statutory rights. Yet here, too, the Court has reaffirmed the federal
courts‘ power to order relief necessary to cure specific constitutional violations. See Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349–50 (1996) (―It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants . . .
who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts . . . to shape
the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.‖).
246. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 863, 872–79, 885–86
(2006) (detailing effect of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer‘s enforcement actions
against securities industry on the SEC, in particular sparking greater SEC enforcement).
247. Graves v. New York ex rel. O‘Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939).
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arrested at the will of one of its members.‖248 In Tarble’s Case, for example—
an 1871 decision denying state courts habeas jurisdiction over federal officials
to challenge military custody of an allegedly underage soldier—the Court
proclaimed that from ―the distinct and independent character of the two
governments, within their respective spheres of action, it follows that neither
can intrude with its judicial process into the domain of the other, except so far
as such intrusion may be necessary . . . [for] the National government to
preserve its rightful supremacy.‖249 Similarly, fifty years earlier the Court
denied the states mandamus power over federal officials, holding in McClung
v. Silliman that the conduct of a federal government or agent ―can only be
controlled by the power that created him‖ and emphasizing the extraordinary
character of mandamus.250 The Court also initially voiced strong concerns
about the extent to which application of state law might unduly interfere with

248. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (holding Maryland state tax on Bank of the United States
unconstitutional).
249. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 407 (1871); see also id. at 409 (―It is manifest that the powers
of the National government could not be exercised with energy and efficiency at all times, if its
acts could be interfered with and controlled for any period by officers or tribunals of another
sovereignty.‖); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1858) (holding unconstitutional
state habeas relief against federal officer that contradicted prior federal court decision). As noted
below, see infra text accompanying note 269, Tarble’s Case has received substantial criticism,
but its prohibition on state habeas over federal officials is generally acknowledged to remain the
governing rule, at least as long as the federal courts stand open for federal habeas claims and
Congress has not sanctioned such state relief. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Applying the
Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1068, 1074 n.31 (1998) (noting
―implied exclusion of state jurisdiction [over habeas claims] would vanish‖ if federal statutes
withdrew federal jurisdiction); Todd E. Pettys, State Habeas Relief for Federal Extrajudicial
Detainees, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 268 (2007) (calling prohibition on state habeas over federal
officials ―too widely accepted to be seriously questioned‖).
250. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 605 (1821). The extent to which the Court meant in McClung
to adopt a general rule against state mandamus is unclear; much of the Court‘s reasoning appears
to turn on its previous determination that the federal courts lacked power of mandamus in the
same dispute, which involved efforts to force a federal land office official to issue a deed. See id.
at 599–601, 605 (discussing McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813) and emphasizing
that federal government had ―withh[eld] from its own Courts[] the exercise of this controlling
power over its ministerial officers‖). However, ―McClung has been interpreted to exclude state
court mandamus against federal officials under any circumstances.‖ Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al.,
Hart and Wechsler‘s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 406 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter
Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler]; see also Arnold, supra note 219, at 1392 (―McClung has been
deemed controlling . . . when state courts have been asked or have attempted to mandamus federal
officers.‖). The Court has never addressed whether the states have power to enjoin federal
officials, but several other courts have concluded from McClung and Tarble’s Case that states
lack injunctive power as well. See, e.g., Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 37 N.E.2d
225, 226–27 (N.Y. 1941); see also Arnold, supra note 219, at 1393–1406 (discussing cases and
arguing in favor of state court jurisdiction over injunctive suits); Martin H. Redish & Curtis E.
Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical
Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 88 (1975) (―[A] stronger case exists for
forbidding [state court] injunctive power [against federal officials] than for disallowing habeas
power.‖).
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the operations of federal agencies and instrumentalities.251 Much of the
resultant doctrine of federal intergovernmental immunity has been cut back
over time, with such concerns now addressed largely under the aegis of
preemption.252 Still, some prohibitions remain that underscore the importance
of a direct-indirect distinction, such as the rule that ―the States can never tax
the United States directly but can tax any private parties with whom it does
business, even though the financial burden falls on the United States, as long as
the tax‖ is nondiscriminatory.253 And at times federal officers have been held
exempt from state criminal law for actions within the scope of their federal
duties, even absent a preempting federal statute, on grounds of federal
supremacy.254
In the end, however, a categorical constitutional bar to direct state law
targeting of federal agencies and officers cannot be sustained. To begin with,
federal officers have never been deemed automatically exempt from state
substantive law, including state criminal law. Instead, the availability of
immunity depends on the scope of the officials‘ authority under federal law.255
More importantly, federal officers have long been subject to state tort suits for
their unlawful actions.256 Indeed, tort liability represented a basic mechanism
251. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326–30 (1819) (―[T]he law
of Congress . . . must have its full and complete effects‖ and ―cannot be either defeated or
impeded by acts of State legislation.‖).
252. See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 434–35 (1990) (―Claims to any
further degree of immunity must be resolved under principles of congressional pre-emption.‖);
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 520–23 (1988) (―[G]overnment contract immunities
recognized under prior doctrine were, one by one, eliminated.‖).
253. Baker, 485 U.S. at 523; see also North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 435 (―A state regulation is
invalid only if it regulates the United States directly or discriminates against the Federal
Government or those with whom it deals.‖); Graves v. New York ex rel. O‘Keefe, 306 U.S. 466,
487 (1939) (emphasizing ―any indirect or incidental‖ burden borne by federal or state government
by other government‘s taxation of its employees ―is but the normal incident of the organization
within the same territory of two governments‖ and is constitutional).
254. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1889) (holding federal marshal immune from state
criminal prosecution for actions undertaken to protect federal official and stating ―if in doing that
act he did no more than what was necessary and proper for him to do, he cannot be guilty of a
crime under [state] law‖); see also Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 56–57 (1920) (overturning
federal mail truck driver‘s conviction and fine for failing to obtain state license, stating ―[s]uch a
requirement does not merely touch the Government servants remotely by a general rule of
conduct; it lays hold of them in their specific attempt to obey orders and requires qualifications in
addition to those that the Government has pronounced sufficient‖); Waxman & Morrison, supra
note 206, at 2232–37 (discussing Neagle‘s approach to Supremacy Clause immunity).
255. See Waxman & Morrison, supra note 206, at 2202 (―Although the relevant case law is
limited, it does establish that an officer‘s entitlement to immunity is determined by examining the
reasonableness of his actions in light of his federal powers and duties alone, irrespective of the
requirements of state criminal law.‖).
256. See, e.g., Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284, 286–87 (1851) (allowing state court
trover action against postmaster); see also Arnold, supra note 219, at 1394 (discussing cases in
which federal officials sued for damages in state courts); Redish & Woods, supra note 250, at 81–
82 (same). In addition, the Court upheld the power of state courts to issue writs of replevin and
ejectment against federal officers. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218 (1882)
(ejectment); Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 12–13 (1817) (replevin); Arnold, supra
note 219, at 1394–95 (discussing ejectment and replevin cases).
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by which federal officers were held accountable for exceeding their
authority.257 Rather than serving as a bar to jurisdiction, federal officers had
to show federal statutory authority as an affirmative defense, and they were
liable for damages under state law if their actions were found unauthorized.258
Such state tort suits against federal officers based on their official conduct
represent a direct targeting of federal administrative action.259 Although today
direct state tort liability for federal officers is largely precluded under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),260 this immunity is the result of
congressional action rather than constitutional dictate. Moreover, the extent
and scope of a federal officer‘s tort liability still turns on state substantive law
under the FTCA, albeit now based on the federal statute‘s incorporation of
state law as the governing rule.261

257. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1506–07
(1987) (discussing trespass suits as means of remedying unconstitutional federal searches); Ann
Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 396,
409–10 (1987) (discussing ―legality model‖ of executive immunity, under which ―officials of all
ranks‖ may be sued for ―depriv[ing] persons of liberty or property‖).
258. See Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 194–96 & ch. 7 (1965)
(describing rule that officer could defend against damages actions if he ―acted within his
colorable authority‖); James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and
Constitutional Adjudication, 98 Geo. L.J. 117, 134 (2009) (noting that in response to suit ―[t]he
official could respond by trying to show that the search was authorized by federal law‖).
259. Jerry Mashaw appears to disagree, including these suits in the category of actions to
obtain indirect review of federal administrative action, along with tort actions involving two
private parties. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the
Gilded Age, 199 Yale L.J. 1362, 1399–1402, 1407 (2010) [hereinafter Mashaw, Federal
Administration]; cf. Redish & Woods, supra note 250, at 82 (―Any resultant impingement of the
official duties of federal officers [from state tort suits] is, at most, indirect.‖). As discussed
below, however, Mashaw‘s prime focus is on distinguishing such tort actions from suits that
sought to directly control the actions of federal officials through injunctions or writs of
mandamus. See infra text accompanying notes 263–264. I agree that tort actions operate more
―indirectly‖ on federal agencies than injunctions or mandamus. See supra text accompanying
notes 206–209. But I disagree that such state actions against federal officers based on their
official conduct are best viewed as indirect challenges to federal agency action. Although state
tort actions do not seek to control future actions by federal officers, the substance and legality of
officers‘ past actions are nonetheless directly at issue.
260. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the United States is substituted for federal
employees found to be acting within the scope of their employment, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)
(2006), and suit under the FTCA is the exclusive remedy allowed for nonconstitutional torts
committed by federal officers, id. § 2679(b)(1); see also Waxman & Morrison, supra note 206, at
2242–43 (discussing FTCA). The FTCA also prohibits liability for actions taken by federal
employees involving performance or nonperformance of a discretionary function. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a); see also Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 258, at 123 (―Congress, by transforming
claims for law enforcement (and other) torts into claims against the United States under the
FTCA, has largely eliminated state common law remedies as a relevant source of relief for
individuals who have suffered a constitutional injury.‖ (footnote omitted)). For discussion of
other statutes allowing recovery for tortious misconduct, see Lester S. Jayson & Robert C.
Longstreth, Handling Federal Tort Claims § 2.05 (2004).
261. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (stating liability is determined ―in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred‖).
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Two distinctions are critical to understanding the Court‘s varied
jurisprudence here. The first is between efforts to control federal actions in the
future and efforts to remedy past federal misconduct. Both Tarble’s Case and
McClung involved the former; they were efforts to force federal officials to
undertake particular actions.262 Jerry Mashaw has underscored that, until the
twentieth century, such judicial relief was only narrowly available in federal
court: ―Direct review of administrative action by mandamus or injunction was
sharply limited by the Supreme Court‘s position that mandamus was
inappropriate whenever the Administrator was engaged in anything more than
a ministerial, nondiscretionary task.‖263 But, as Mashaw notes, courts were
much more receptive to common law actions seeking simply to remedy past
agency action alleged to have violated individuals‘ rights.264 The Court‘s
precedent prohibiting state efforts in the form of injunctive relief yet allowing
state tort actions thus accords with views about the propriety of certain forms
of judicial relief that existed independent of the federal-state context. Thus, for
example, in Johnson v. Towsley, a suit over the validity of a land patent
between two private parties in which the Court defended the ability of the
courts of equity to correct mistakes in federal Land Office determinations, the
fact that the decision it was affirming was that of the Nebraska Supreme Court
did not factor into the Court‘s analysis.265
The second, and perhaps even more important distinction, is between a
constitutional prohibition on direct state targeting of federal officials and
restrictions that rest on congressional statutes. As a matter of constitutional
structure, a categorical, constitutionally grounded prohibition would be at odds
with the Madisonian Compromise, under which ―state courts would always be
open to hear cases not given by Congress to the federal courts.‖266 The
ultimate residual availability of the state courts to hear federal claims is viewed
today as fundamental to understanding the Constitution‘s grant to Congress of
control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts.267 But it is hard to see how
262. See Tarble‘s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 401–02 (1871) (describing question
presented as ―whether a State court commissioner has jurisdiction . . . to inquire into the validity
of . . . [soldiers‘] enlistment . . . and to discharge them from such service‖); McClung v. Silliman,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 604 (1821) (addressing how ―a State tribunal can . . . issu[e] a mandamus
to the [federal] register of a land office‖); see also McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504, 505
(1813) (predecessor case to McClung in federal court describing claim as mandamus action to
force register to grant plaintiff certificates of purchase for particular lands).
263. Mashaw, Federal Administration, supra note 259, at 1399–1402, 1411–12; see also
Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and ―The Democracy‖: Administrative Law from Jackson to
Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 Yale L.J. 1568, 1669–84 (2008) (discussing limited availability of
mandamus during early nineteenth century).
264. Mashaw, Federal Administration, supra note 259, at 1399–1400, 1407–10.
265. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72, 83–84, 86, 91 (1871); see also Mashaw, Federal Administration,
supra note 259, at 1409–10 (discussing Johnson).
266. Redish & Woods, supra note 250, at 96 .
267. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1401 (1953) (―The state courts always
have a general jurisdiction to fall back on.‖); see also Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State
Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 39, 42–44 (discussing
Madisonian compromise and understanding of state court role).
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the state courts could play this role—at least in cases involving state
enforcement of federal laws, such as Tarble’s Case and McClung268—if as a
constitutional matter state courts lacked jurisdiction to grant relief against
federal officials. Indeed, Tarble’s Case has been much criticized as
fundamentally at odds with the Madisonian Compromise, as well as with
original practice under which state courts regularly entertained habeas
challenges.269
Little dispute exists, however, that Congress has authority to preempt
state action targeting federal agencies or federal officials.270 In fact, the
overarching theme of commentary in this area is that it is ultimately up to
Congress to decide what role the states are to play in monitoring and
controlling the actions of federal officers.271 Unsurprisingly, therefore,
Tarble’s Case and McClung are often thought best understood as concluding
that Congress had prohibited the types of state action involved, rather than as
invoking a constitutional prohibition.272 Congress, moreover, has acted,
adopting several statutes that either preclude or significantly limit direct
application of state law to federal agencies and officers. Prime among these
are the FTCA‘s preclusion of state tort actions against federal officers found to
be acting within the scope of their employment;273 the APA‘s waiver of

268. See Tarble‘s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 409–12 (1871); McClung v. Silliman, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 604–05 (1821); see also Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 37
N.E.2d 225, 226 (1941) (denying states have power to ―control the manner in which a Federal
agency performs or attempts to perform its functions and duties under the Tariff Act or other
Federal statute where the Federal government has exclusive jurisdiction‖).
269. See Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 250, at 402–03, 437–39 (scrutinizing
Tarble’s Case on these grounds); Pettys, supra note 249, at 294–96 (same). But see Redish &
Woods, supra note 250, at 50, 81–92 (concluding Tarble’s Case represents constitutional bar to
certain forms of state relief against federal officers and remains good law).
270. Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 250, at 390–91. Such congressional
restrictions on state action are quite different from the congressional efforts to force or
―commandeer‖ the states to implement federal regulation that the Court has invalidated on
federalism grounds. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (prohibiting federal
commandeering of state executive officers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166
(1992) (prohibiting federal commandeering of state legislatures).
271. See Pettys, supra note 249, at 296 & n.177 (collecting sources).
272. For arguments to this effect on Tarble’s Case, see Amar, supra note 257, at 1509–10
(arguing Court‘s analysis in Tarble’s Case and Ableman v. Booth, the pre-Civil War decision on
which Tarble’s Case relied, ―was shaky, and its language quite sloppy‖ and concluding these
decisions ―can be justified only if they are understood simply as attributing to Congress a desire
for exclusive federal court jurisdiction in habeas proceedings against federal officers‖); Waxman
& Morrison, supra note 206, at 2224–27 (concluding similarly Tarble’s Case is best read as
reflecting congressional determination to limit habeas jurisdiction over federal officers to federal
courts). But see Arnold, supra note 219, at 1390–93 (noting statutory basis of McClung but
arguing that in Tarble’s Case ―Justice Field‘s language indicates that the Constitution forbids
state jurisdiction ex proprio vigore‖); Collins, supra note 267, at 98–104 (concluding both
Tarble’s Case and McClung were originally based in Constitution but noting statutory view
avoids problems with constitutional account); Redish & Woods, supra note 250, at 96–102
(defending Tarble’s Case as constitutionally based).
273. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a) (2006).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW - FORTHCOMING

57

sovereign immunity for nonmonetary actions against federal agencies brought
in federal court;274 and the federal removal statute‘s grant of broad powers to
federal officers to remove to federal court state civil and criminal actions filed
against them for acts committed under color of their office.275 As a statutory
matter, the comprehensive scheme that Congress has provided for remedying
federal administrative transgressions leaves little room or need for resort to
state remedial measures.
Congress‘s central role in structuring state involvement in federal
regulation suggests that a potentially fruitful way of understanding the directindirect distinction is in terms of its operation as a constitutionally inspired
default rule, trumpable by Congress.276 Under this approach, absent
congressional indication to the contrary, state measures directly targeting
federal agency decisions or seeking to control the actions of federal officials
would be presumptively preempted, whereas indirect state measures would be
presumptively valid. This formulation accords nicely with the preemption
decisions, which invoked presumptions against preemption in the context of
measures affecting federal agencies indirectly, as well as with Buckman, which
deemed a presumption against preemption inappropriate precisely because of
the federal nature of the activities targeted by state law.277 Yet even a
presumptive direct-indirect distinction is ultimately unsustainable across the
board. The problem is not the presumptive validity of indirect state measures,
but rather condemning as presumptively illegitimate all direct state targeting of
federal agencies. That would go well beyond existing precedent and statutory
measures, which focus instead on protecting the federal government from state
law intrusions that would impede the ability of federal agents to function.278
Thus, they prohibit efforts by states to ―interrupt the acts of the general
government itself,‖279 and limit the extent to which federal officers and
agencies face state law liability for their actions.280 To be sure, a concern with
274. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
275. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1); see also Arnold, supra note 219, at 1405 (―[F]ederal
officers have the protection of removal.‖); Waxman & Morrison, supra note 206, at 2228–30
(discussing removal statute).
276. For a similar constitutional-default-rule account of prohibitions on interstate
discrimination, see Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 Harv.
L. Rev. 1468, 1475 (2007) (―[T]he antidiscrimination provisions of Article IV are best
understood, like the dormant commerce clause, as constitutional default rules.‖).
277. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs‘ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347–48 (2001) (―[T]he
relationship between a federal agency and the entity it regulates is inherently federal in
character . . . .‖).
278. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–460 (1990) (noting, in suit between
private parties, state courts are ―presumptively competent . . . to adjudicate claims arising under
the laws of the United States‖ and thus ―have concurrent jurisdiction ‗where it is not excluded by
express provision, or by incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular
case‘‖ (quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876))). For a skeptical view of implied
preemption defenses of limits on state habeas jurisdiction over federal officers, see Pettys, supra
note 249, at 297–307.
279. Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 55 (1920).
280. See Staff of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Federal Employees Liability Reform and
Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), H.R. Rep. No. 100-700, at 3 (1988), reprinted in
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protecting against state law prohibitions and restrictions on the actions of
federal officials supports viewing state law efforts that seek to overturn or
enjoin federal administrative actions as presumptively preempted.281 These
actions might well be deemed actually preempted by the APA and other
federal statutes granting rights of action to remedy arbitrary and unlawful
agency action in federal court. This rationale, however, could not justify a
presumption of preemption in the Buckman situation, in which state law
directly targeted federal agency decisionmaking but did not (a) impose liability
on any federal actor; (b) render any federal decision legally invalid, or
(c) purport to control future federal agency action. Preemption of such actions
could still result from the substantive regulatory statute at issue (the FDCA in
Buckman), but certainly not from general federalism principles alone.
Even more plainly, these precedents and statutes do not support a
presumption against direct state targeting of federal administrative action that
takes the form of suits brought by state actors in federal court and under
federal law. A strong case could be made that such state conduct is preferable
to state efforts to influence federal agencies more indirectly. Dangers of a
single state imposing its policy preferences on the nation as a whole are
assuaged by the need to prove a claim under federal law to a federal tribunal.
At a minimum, barring statutory language to the contrary, states should be
equally able to sue under statutes that provide rights of action against federal
officers or agencies in federal court, such as the APA. Moreover, such state
suits are regularly entertained, at least when the state asserts an injury to its
sovereign or proprietary interests, such as federal imposition of
unconstitutional requirements or federal action that harms state property.282
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5947 (―The possible exposure of Federal employees to personal
liability could lead to a substantial diminution in the vigor of Federal law enforcement and
implementation.‖); see also Springer v. Bryant, 897 F.2d 1085, 1086–87 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting
Congress passed Westfall Act creating absolute immunity for federal employees who commit
common law torts as a result of the ―immediate crisis in which all federal employees were
confronted with the prospect of being held personally liable for actions taken within the scope of
their employment‖ and because Congress feared ―that this potential threat of personal liability and
protracted tort litigation could undermine the morale of federal employees and the effectiveness
of the agencies in which they were employed‖). Insofar as state court suits target federal agencies
rather than federal officers, they likely would be barred by federal sovereign immunity, as the
APA‘s waiver of sovereign immunity would not apply. See 5 U.S.C. §702 (2006) (waiving
sovereign immunity for certain claims against the United States brought ―in a court of the United
States‖).
281. Akhil Amar and Richard Arnold have rejected this proposition, arguing that such state
law actions against federal officials should be deemed constitutional and questioning the
correctness of decisions such as Tarble’s Case to the contrary. See Amar supra note 257, at
1504–17; Arnold, supra note 219, at 1401–03 (defending state court power to enjoin federal
officials).
282. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154 (1992) (deciding state suit
challenging federal regulation of states as unconstitutional); Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of
Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 277–78, 280 (1983) (deciding state suit against federal
government over title to river bed); see also Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 187, at 1034–35
(advocating state standing based on ―sovereign interest in preserving its own law‖); Ann
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The situation is somewhat different when a state sues the federal
government in its parens patriae capacity asserting quasi-sovereign interests,
including interests in obtaining benefits to which its residents are entitled under
federal law.283 In the past, the Court has rejected state parens patriae suits
against the federal government on the grounds that ―the United States, not the
State, represents the citizens as parens patriae in their relations to the federal
government.‖284 The recent decision in Massachusetts v. EPA calls this limit
on such suits into question, however, with the Court there not only upholding a
state‘s suit against a federal agency‘s failure to regulate but further invoking its
parens patriae jurisprudence to justify its assertion of ―special solicitude‖ for
the states in standing analysis.285 According to the Massachusetts majority,
the Court‘s precedents at most bar state parens patriae suits that seek to protect
state residents from the operation of federal laws, not suits in which states seek
to assert rights under those federal laws.286 In any event, the undeniable
ability of states to sue federal agencies in federal court in other contexts
suffices to preclude any across-the-board presumption against states directly
targeting federal administrative action through federal court litigation.
In sum, an approach that views direct state targeting of federal action as
presumptively preempted may well be appropriate as applied to some state
measures, such as suits in state court (based on either state or federal law) that
seek to control the future actions of federal officers or federal agencies. But a
presumptive approach is not justified across the board; in particular, it is not
sustainable as applied to contexts such as Buckman (in which state law may
directly target federal decisionmaking without seeking to overturn agency
decisions or impose liability on federal officers) or Summers (in which federal
agencies are directly sued under federal law in federal court). Thus, even this
more modest approach fails to vindicate the direct-indirect distinction as a full
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 Va. L. Rev. 387, 510 (1995) (advocating
state standing when ―Congress undermines [state sovereignty] by forcing the states to legislate or
to undertake other affirmative tasks‖).
283. See Alfred L. Snapp v. Puerto Rico ex rel Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607–08 (1982)
(including benefits from federal statutes within category of quasi-sovereign interests that state can
assert in parens patriae action).
284. Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 445–46, 450–52 (1945); see also Massachusetts
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923) (―While the state, under some circumstances, may sue in
that capacity for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their
rights in respect of their relations with the federal government. In that field it is the United States,
and not the state, which represents them as parens patriae . . . .‖). For a defense of the traditional
approach, see Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 79, 86–90.
285. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–20 (2007); Calvin Massey, State Standing
After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 249, 264–66, 268 (2009) (―[T]he Court in
[Massachusetts] was actually saying that a state has standing to assert the rights of its residents
under federal law.‖).
286. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17; see also Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485 (leaving open
whether state may ever sue ―to protect its citizens against any forms of enforcement of
unconstitutional acts of Congress‖). For a thorough discussion of case law on state parens patriae
standing in suits against federal agencies before Massachusetts, see generally Comment, State
Standing to Challenge Federal Administrative Action: A Re-Examination of the Parens Patriae
Doctrine, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1069 (1977).
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explanation for the tension between the preemption decisions and these other
lines of jurisprudence.
3. Lessons from the Past: The Repeated Failure of Federalism-Based
Direct-Indirect Distinctions.—The difficulty involved in justifying a
categorical federalism-based distinction between direct and indirect efforts to
improve federal agencies should come as no surprise. Previous attempts to use
formalistic direct-indirect distinctions to navigate federal and state
relationships have also failed, and for many of the same reasons. Perhaps the
most prominent of these was the Court‘s effort to confine exercise of
Congress‘s commerce power to measures that directly targeted the movement
of goods and services in interstate commerce and its prohibition on
congressional regulation of activities (such as manufacturing, mining, or
agriculture) that affected interstate commerce indirectly.287 This effort was
combined with a less well-known mirror restriction on the states, under which
the Court invalidated state measures that it concluded directly targeted
interstate commerce but sustained state legislation that was deemed to affect
interstate commerce only indirectly.288
Both of these direct-indirect
distinctions failed to hold, for familiar reasons: the lack of a clear divide
between activities said to affect interstate commerce directly as opposed to
indirectly; and the extent to which supposedly indirect effects could vitiate
federal efforts to regulate interstate commerce.289 As a result, it became clear
that these direct-indirect distinctions artificially constrained the legitimate
sphere of federal and state regulation.290
Similarly here, the direct-indirect distinction suggested by the Court‘s
case law fits poorly with both practical reality and constitutional principle. Of

287. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309 (1936) (finding act unconstitutional
that sought to ―regulate and minimize . . . local controversies and evils affecting local work‖ and
that ―[s]uch effect as they may have upon commerce, however extensive it may be, is secondary
and indirect‖); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935) (―In
determining how far the federal government may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon the
ground that they ‗affect‘ interstate commerce, there is a necessary and well-established distinction
between direct and indirect effects.‖).
288. See, e.g., Simpson v. Shepard (Minnesota Rate Cases), 230 U.S. 352, 402, 410–11
(1913) (permitting state law ―extend[ing] incidentally‖ to ―interstate business‖); see also Barry
Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1089,
1110–20 (2000) (discussing this line of cases); Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 417, 443 (2008) (noting direct-indirect
test).
289. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding commerce power can reach
purely intrastate activities); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37, 40 (1937)
(holding commerce power extends to intrastate activities that have ―close and substantial relation
to interstate commerce‖). See generally Cushman, supra note 288, at 1094–100 (tracing
development of direct-indirect distinction).
290. See Cushman, supra note 288, at 1094 (noting direct-indirect distinction ―appears
artificial, wooden, even silly‖); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 605 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (describing direct-indirect cases as ―applying highly formalistic notions of
‗commerce‘‖).
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particular importance, the distinction embodies an unduly narrow view of the
states‘ legitimate scope of concern. The image of the federal and state
governments as occupying separate and independent spheres of action
articulated in Tarble’s Case was cast aside by the New Deal.291 The Court has
now long acknowledged that the central federalism dynamic is one of
concurrent and overlapping jurisdiction—precisely the reason that preemption
has risen so prominently to the fore.292 As the range of legitimate federal
regulatory authority has expanded, so too has the scope of legitimate state
interest and involvement in federal regulation. The success or failure of
federal regulatory efforts has a profound effect upon the ―States qua States.‖293
Federal agency failures can result in the states themselves having to undertake
regulatory action or face substantial public expenditures, in part given the
states‘ roles in federal regulatory programs.294 States also have a significant
interest in the success of federal regulatory efforts because those efforts often
displace state measures and render the states unable to regulate in their own
right.295 Massachusetts emphasized this point, noting the possibility of
preemption as one reason why states are ―entitled to special solicitude in our
standing analysis.‖296

291. See Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism 37–47, 55 (2009) (tracing federalism
developments from Lochner era through New Deal and Civil Rights eras).
292. Cf. Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2072 (―Given the overlapping
character of federal and state regulatory power, most substantive determinations by federal
agencies hold the potential to displace state law . . . .‖).
293. Nat‘l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847 (1976).
294. For example, northeastern states challenged the Bush Administration‘s ozone standards
as too lax, arguing that the effect was to increase these states‘ burdens in meeting emissions
standards under the CAA. See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(―Evidence in the record demonstrates that states in the eastern United States have difficulty
attaining ozone standards because of ozone . . . emissions in upwind states.‖). States have also
sued the Department of Health and Human Services to prohibit its adoption of more restrictive
regulations under the SCHIP program. See Christopher Lee, N.J. Wants Rules for Health Plan
Blocked: Lawsuit Says Children Would Suffer, Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 2007, at A3 (describing state
suit challenging federal implementation of SCHIP program). Even outside of such cooperative
programs, federal regulatory failures can force state responses; states today are faced with
communities devastated by the subprime mortgage scandal and failure of federal oversight. See
Nicholas Bagley, Subprime Safeguards We Needed, Wash. Post, Jan. 25, 2008, at A19 (―To
combat this surge in predatory lending, some state legislatures decided to stanch the flow of easy
credit to subprime lenders.‖); Michael Powell, Federal Judge Rejects Suit by Baltimore Against
Bank, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 2010, at A11 (noting federal judge dismissed Baltimore‘s lawsuit
against Wells Fargo because ―the city could not prove that the bank‘s lending practices had
resulted in broad damage to poor neighborhoods‖).
295. See Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Petitioner at 2, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (No. 05-1342) (arguing if
regulation at issue ―is allowed to stand, it would render States powerless to protect their residents
from abusive and discriminatory consumer practices‖ and that ―OCC would usurp that function,
even though it is ill-equipped to perform it‖); Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 21, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No.05-1120)
(―[W]hen administrative decisions have the potential to preempt state law and thus interfere with
the State‘s interest in creating and enforcing its own legal code, States are injured, and it is the
administrative decision that causes that injury.‖).
296. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20.
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B. Federalism for the Future: A Special State Role in Monitoring and
Improving Federal Administration?
The inadequacies of the direct-indirect distinction in explaining the
Court‘s varying jurisprudence leaves open a more radical possibility: Rather
than attempting to fit the recent preemption decisions within the Court‘s
existing precedent, perhaps they are better understood as representing a shift in
the Court‘s views. Along with Massachusetts v. EPA, the decisions could
signal that the Court has adopted a new understanding of federal-state relations
under which the states have a special role in monitoring and improving federal
administration.
The idea that the states may have such a role to play in checking and
reforming federal administration is intriguing. But substantial analytic and
normative work remains to be done for such an account to be viable. The
Court itself has provided little clarification of what such a role for the states
might mean in practice or of its implications for existing jurisprudence. In
addition, it has almost wholly failed to justify why the states should be
assigned any such role—and more specifically, why the responsibility for
assigning them a role falls to the Court rather than to Congress.
1. The Scope and Implications of a Special State Role.—The strongest
support for the view that the Court may be assigning the states a special role in
reforming federal administration comes in Massachusetts. There, the Court
repeatedly invoked the ―special position and interest‖ of the states in
concluding that the states are ―entitled to special solicitude in our standing
analysis.‖297 Massachusetts indicates the states should be accorded special
access to federal court in order to challenge federal agency action. But the
exact contours of this access remain obscure.
On the one hand, it seems unlikely that the Court intended to free the
states entirely from traditional standing requirements when they seek to
challenge federal agency action. After emphasizing the importance of state
status, the majority proceeded to analyze whether Massachusetts, like a private
litigant, had demonstrated sufficient injury, causation, and redressability to
have standing.298 Moreover, freeing the states from these requirements
entirely would set up a stark contest between federalism and separation of
powers principles, as the Court has held they represent the minima necessary

297. Id. at 518, 520.
298. See Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 187, at 1033, 1036 (concluding Massachusetts
still requires satisfaction of traditional standing requirements, but using less restrictive analysis);
see also Mank, States Standing, supra note 187, at 1779 (―It is unlikely that the Court meant to
abolish standing for states . . . .‖); Massey, supra note 285, at 261–62, 271–72 (arguing
Massachusetts allows states to sue on generalizable interests, but some injury requirement
remains). But see Robert A. Weinstock, Note, The Lorax State: Parens Patriae and the Provision
of Public Goods, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 798, 826–30 (2009) (arguing parens patriae and Lujan
analyses in Massachusetts were separate and suggesting traditional standing analysis does not
apply to state assertion of quasi-sovereign interests).
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for a challenge to satisfy Article III‘s ―case or controversy‖ limitation on
federal jurisdiction.299 Even the parens patriae jurisprudence on which the
Court relies necessitates some showing beyond ―[t]he mere fact that a state is
the plaintiff‖ for suit to lie.300 A state must demonstrate that its quasisovereign interests are implicated, which would appear to necessitate some
showing of at least potential harm to the health and economic well-being of its
residents or their ability to obtain the benefits of federal law.301 Not
surprisingly, lower court decisions since Massachusetts have held that the
decision does not excuse states from meeting the traditional Article III
requirements for standing.302
On the other hand, the Court‘s treatment of whether Massachusetts met
these requirements was notably lenient. It sustained Massachusetts‘s right to
sue based on fairly generalized and speculative claims of injury and causation,
expressly tying its analysis of these requirements to Massachusetts‘s state
status.303 Equally important is Massachusetts‘s holding that states could sue
federal agencies as parens patriae to assert the rights of their residents under
federal statutes.304 Further, Massachusetts‘s lenient approach to satisfying
Article III requirements suggests that states may be able to bring such parens
patriae suits without having to show that their residents had suffered
identifiable harms clearly traceable to federal regulatory failure or redressable
by regulatory action.305
Thus, Massachusetts may presage dramatically expanded access to the
federal courts for state suits challenging federal administrative action,
assuming a majority of Justices continue to adhere to its approach.306 Wyeth,
in turn, may push this access even further, with its approval of state efforts to
improve the overall functioning of federal agencies. Combined, these
decisions could lead to a significant qualification on the Summers line of
precedent, with states being found to have standing to bring the kind of overall
challenges to agency functioning and policy that the federal courts have
previously refused to entertain. To be sure, several of the decisions holding
such challenges nonjusticiable have rested on grounds other than standing,
299. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992).
300. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927).
301. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602, 607–
08 (1982) (describing characteristics of quasi-sovereign interest).
302. See, e.g., North Carolina v. EPA, 587 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir.2009); Del. Dep‘t of
Natural Res. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm‘n, 558 F.3d 575, 579 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
303. See Massey, supra note 285, at 255–61 (discussing Massachusetts‘s ―uniquely relaxed
interpretation‖ of standing analysis).
304. See supra text accompanying notes 283–286.
305. See Mank, States Standing, supra note 187, at 1775–80 (arguing for this as result of
Massachusetts); Massey, supra note 285, at 268–71 (arguing, post-Massachusetts, ―generalized
injury is sufficient to constitute quasi-sovereign injury‖); Weinstock, supra note 298, at 826–28
(arguing Massachusetts ―treated damage to state-owned property as surplus to a parens patriae
action‖).
306. Cf. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 131, at 70, 92–96 (arguing decision in
Massachusetts is driven by Court‘s perception of politicized decisionmaking in context of urgent
regulatory need and special state standing may not expand much beyond that case).
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specifically a lack of ripeness or of final agency action.307 But it is hard to see
why a special solicitude for the states that allows them greater ease in
satisfying constitutional standing requirements would not result in the states
being granted more leeway with respect to these jurisdictional obstacles as
well.308
For example, it is not hard to imagine that states would be able to sue to
challenge an agency‘s policy on preemption, even prior to a specific
preemption challenge arising. Such a suit—which could be seen as asserting
either a state‘s sovereign interest in its own power to govern or its quasisovereign interest in protecting its citizens from harms—draws particular
support from Massachusetts‘s reference to preemption as a basis for according
states special solicitude in assessing standing.309 But in addition, states might
be able to challenge an agency‘s general failure to comply with statutory
requirements or perform its statutorily assigned responsibilities adequately. To
use the statutory context of Wyeth as an example, perhaps states could sue the
FDA over its poor record in monitoring drugs post-approval. Agency failure
of this sort could pose a threat to the well-being of state residents, supporting
standing under Massachusetts, and Wyeth sanctioned the use of state law to
achieve a similar agency-reforming effect.
Wyeth also suggests that a special state role in monitoring and improving
federal administration might not be limited to the federal court context, but
instead could extend to efforts to reform federal agencies through use of state
law. Recognizing such a state role might lead the Court to uphold state law
measures like the fraud-on-the-FDA claims at issue in Buckman, which aim to
use state law liability to protect federal agency decisionmaking or reinforce
federal standards. It might also support taking a broad view of the states‘

307. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass‘n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732–37 (1998)
(unripe); Lujan v. Nat‘l Wildlife Fed‘n, 497 U.S. 871, 890 (1990) (no final action).
308. In particular, deference to a state‘s assessment of when its quasi-sovereign interests are
implicated may make it easier for states to demonstrate that their claims are ripe and also that an
agency action sufficiently represents the agency‘s official position to allow for challenge. For
examples of private litigants hindered by these jurisdictional obstacles, see Nat‘l Park Hospitality
Ass‘n v. Dep‘t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808–12 (2003) (concluding that challenge to agency
policy statement was unripe due to lack of hardship, even though policy statement was final
agency action); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (requiring final agency action
subject to suit under APA to be ―consummation of the agency‘s decisionmaking process‖ and
―one by which . . . legal consequences will flow‖ (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Port
of Bos. Marine Terminal Ass‘n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
309. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007); see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son,
Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (quasi-sovereign interest); Wyoming
ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) (sovereign interest);
Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1015, 1073–74 (2010) (arguing
that Massachusetts‘s special state standing is best read as allowing states to challenge ―null
preemption,‖ or preemption that creates a regulatory void). State suits to challenge preemption
had sometimes been allowed before Massachusetts. See, e.g., Alaska v. U.S. Dep‘t of Transp.,
868 F.2d 441, 443–44 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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ability to enforce federal standards.310 A special state role conceivably could
extend even further to authorizing state court efforts seeking directly to control
federal agency decisionmaking, such as the state habeas and mandamus actions
at issue in Tarble’s Case and McClung, though such a move would represent
quite a dramatic departure from current practice. Of course, Congress could
preempt any state law effort to police federal agency action, and thus, cast as
interpretations of the federal statutes at issue, Buckman and these earlier
precedents might still stand. Yet to the extent these decisions embody the
broader proposition that policing federal agency action is not an appropriate
state function, the Court‘s view would now be quite different.311 State law
targeting of federal agency action could become presumptively available,
absent express preemption or a relatively clear case of federal-state law
conflict.
As a result, assigning the states a special role with respect to reforming
federal administration has the potential to work a dramatic change in existing
practice and precedent. That is perhaps reason enough to proceed cautiously
before reading the preemption decisions in this fashion, absent clearer
indications from the Court that it intends such a move.
2. Justifying a Special State Role.—An equally serious weakness is the
Court‘s failure so far to provide a justification for assigning the states such a
special role. One might defend such a role on several different grounds. One
possible basis is the belief that states are likely to be particularly effective
monitors of agencies and instigators of administrative change. States gain
special knowledge about federal administrative deficiencies from frequent
involvement in implementing federal programs, as well as from their own
independent regulatory undertakings.312 States may have substantial access to
Congress through their state representatives, allowing them to raise concerns
about federal agency actions and perhaps prompt federal oversight.313 States
also have the capacity to sue if needed, particularly when they partner with

310. See Widman, supra note 141 (manuscript at 4–5, 36–40) (advocating state
enforcement of federal regulations).
311. As noted above, the contrast between Wyeth and Buckman, as well as the split
summary affirmance in Desiano, suggest some movement away from such a strong view of
Buckman. See supra text accompanying notes 168–169.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 293–296; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen &
Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256, 1288 (2009) (advocating
―uncooperative federalism‖ in which ―states can take advantage of the connective ties that bind
them to federal officials‖ which in turn ―yield[s] knowledge of the system and personal relations
with the people best positioned to change the policy‖); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law,
Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1692,
1698–1703 (2001) (discussing rationales for cooperative enforcement of national regulatory
regimes).
313. See Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to
Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 Urb. Law. 301, 335–36 (1988)
(―[I]nstitutional linkages help to secure access and attention for state and local concerns.‖); see
also Mendelson, Chevron, supra note 58, at 762 (noting state organizations, such as National
Governors‘ Association and National Conference of State Legislatures, ―seem well-positioned to
have their voices heard in [congressional] decisionmaking‖).
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other states.314
Yet although these features could empower states as federal agency
overseers, they do not suffice to differentiate all states in all contexts. States
may lack any special knowledge in areas in which they are inactive, and
inevitably some states will have far superior expertise and resources than
others. Moreover, public interest organizations—like the environmental
groups who initially petitioned the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases in
Massachusetts or who sought to challenge the Forest Service‘s practices in
Summers—also often have extensive expertise, deep knowledge of how federal
programs are operating, substantial litigating capacity, and close connections to
Congress.315
What does differentiate the states from private litigants is their political
accountability.
State challenges to federal administrative action are
overwhelmingly brought by state attorneys general who are accountable to the
voters in their states for how they direct the resources of their offices.316
However, political accountability is very much a two-edged sword. It may act
as a constraint on excessive litigation, thus limiting the disruptive potential on
federal agencies of allowing states special court access.317 Alternatively, as
the current healthcare reform litigation demonstrates, their political
accountability may also prompt state officials to bring suit to challenge federal
actions that are unpopular in their states.318 The political accountability of

314. See Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of the State
Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1998, 2003–07 (2001) (discussing
development of cooperation among state attorneys general).
315. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Standing on the Wrong Foot: A Case for Equal Protection,
58 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 43 (2007) (―[P]ublic interest organizations are far and away the best
plaintiffs in environmental cases for the relatively greater resources and expertise they can bring
to the court on . . . highly complex issues.‖). But see Peter M. Lavigne, The Movement for
American Ecosystem Restoration and Interactive Environmental Decisionmaking: Quagmire,
Diversion, or Our Last, Best Hope?, 17 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 1, 44 (2003) (―[M]ost environmental
NGOs do not have the resources to match business interests in expertise, training, or staff time.‖).
316. See Mank, States Standing, supra note 187, at 1783–85 (―State AGs must respond to a
broad range of constituents and therefore have incentive to serve the public interest.‖); Massey,
supra note 285, at 274–75 & n.103 (―State attorneys general have limited resources and are
politically constrained.‖).
317. See Lemos, supra note 108, at 37 (arguing that ―state enforcement seems significantly
less prone to overenforcement than . . . private enforcement‖); Massey, supra note 285, at 279
(―An attorney general who devotes inordinate attention to litigation of public rights in federal
court . . . may encounter voter discontent.‖). Moreover, the political accountability of states need
not undermine the effectiveness of states as a check on federal agency failure or capture by
regulated interests, as the political constituencies to which the states respond may be different
from those which are most effective at the federal level. See Hills, Against Preemption, supra
note 24, at 23 (noting different mix of constituencies at state and federal level); Widman, supra
note 141 (manuscript at 43) (same).
318. See Editorial, Health Care Reform and the Courts, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2010, at A26
(noting ―many of the [attorneys general] behind these suits are running for re-election or higher
office,‖ including lead plaintiff, Florida‘s Attorney General Bill McCollum); see also Mank,
States Standing, supra note 187, at 1783–84 (discussing political impact of Massachusetts on state
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state officials also underscores that states‘ views about what constitutes agency
failure are likely to be ideologically driven. Thus states will often disagree on
this question, and allowing states a special agency-policing role may well
result in legal challenges with different states on opposing sides.319
In any event, even if states were particularly effective monitors of federal
agencies, that fact alone does not suffice to justify a decision by the Court to
assign them a special agency-reforming role. Functional calculations of this
sort fall within the purview of the political branches. As a result, the Court
needs some basis in federal law—statutory, regulatory, or constitutional—for
injecting states into this role. Not surprisingly, therefore, in Massachusetts the
Court invoked constitutional federalism as authority for special state standing,
emphasizing the ―sovereign prerogatives‖ states surrender to the federal
government—including the ability to protect their interests through force,
foreign negotiations, and in some instances domestic regulation.320 A state‘s
inability to use force against sister states to protect itself is a common
justification for parens patriae jurisdiction in the federal courts.321 Substantial
support similarly exists for concluding the Framers intended the federal courts
to serve as an alternative forum for resolving interstate disputes, including
Article III‘s provision for diversity jurisdiction and for disputes involving a
state as a party to come within the Court‘s original jurisdiction.322 But
Congress was also expected to play a central—indeed, the central—role in
resolving interstate disputes,323 and political safeguards of state interests in
Congress are acknowledged to form their primary protection against harmful
federal enactments.324 Thus, simply the fact that the states have ceded
sovereign prerogatives to the federal government does not necessarily translate
into greater access to federal court for states seeking to challenge federal
action.
A stronger constitutional argument, both for expanded federal court
access and for a special role for the states in policing federal administration
more broadly, is that the delegation of extensive policymaking responsibilities
to agencies eviscerates the political checks traditionally relied upon to defend
attorney general elections and interstate cooperation); Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State
Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 Penn. St. L . Rev. 1, 47–50 (2007) (same).
319. Cf. Levy & Glicksman, supra note 153, at 12–17 (detailing how various states may
have incentives to over- or underregulate, depending on their relationship to activity being
regulated).
320. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007).
321. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois,
180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
322. See U.S. Const., art. III, § 2 (defining jurisdiction of federal courts); see also Martin v.
Hunter‘s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) (discussing these various provisions for
federal jurisdiction); The Federalist No. 80, at 361–62 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ernest O‘Dell ed.,
2010) (same).
323. See Metzger, Congress, Article IV, supra note 276, at 1475–76, 1479 (explaining
Congress‘s central role as justified by ―precedent, federalism values, functional concerns, and
history‖).
324. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548–55 (1985)
(discussing such safeguards); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (same).
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state interests. On this account, ensuring states access to federal court to
challenge federal administrative action is necessary to preserve constitutional
federalism in the administrative era.325 This argument has surfaced most
forcefully in the administrative preemption debate, with scholars justifying
independent judicial determination of preemption issues on the grounds that
agencies lack sensitivity to state interests.326 I have elsewhere questioned
whether federal agencies are actually as unresponsive and opposed to state
interests as these arguments suggest, but part of what ensures agency
attentiveness to the states is the potential for judicial review and reversal.327
More generally, it makes sense to conclude that special protections for the
states must develop in the administrative realm if federalism is to have
continuing relevance in the world of national administrative governance that
increasingly dominates today.328
Importantly, however, this justification assumes a critical point: that
courts can legitimately update the federal-state relationship to take account of
modern administrative realities on their own, rather than leaving that task to
Congress. To be sure, constitutional federalism norms may well provide some
justification for such a move, and courts regularly interpret federal statutes
with an eye toward constitutional values, with the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance being a prime example.329 But constitutional avoidance has come
in for substantial criticism as judicial aggrandizement precisely because of its
free-floating constitutionalism.330 Hence, at a minimum judicial authority to

325. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 285, at 267 (―[T]he question of who has standing to
challenge the exercise of that discretion should be informed by the disconnection between
Congress and administrative agencies.‖); see also Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 187, at 1036–
37 (describing protection of state laws ―from being trumped by federal agency action‖ as
―possible sovereign interest‖).
326. See, e.g., Mendelson, Presumption, supra note 27, at 721–22; Merrill, Institutional
Choice, supra note 27, at 755–57.
327. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2072–91. For similar skepticism and
defense of agencies as attentive to state interests, see Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 27, at
1948–83; Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 66, at 2146–55.
328. Cf. Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2090–100 (defending use of
administrative law to address federalism concerns).
329. Id. at 2091–96. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of
Freestanding Federalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. F. 98 (2009), available at
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/LWebsite_Content_for_JenniferForum_Vol._122M
etzgermetzger.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (responding to John Manning‘s
opposition to ―invocation of abstract or freestanding federalism in constitutional interpretation‖).
330. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 816 (1983) (―The practical effect of interpreting statutes to
avoid raising constitutional questions is . . . to create a judge-made constitutional ‗penumbra‘ . . .
[a]nd we do not need that.‖); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71,
89–90 (1995) (explaining why doctrine of constitutional avoidance from Ashwander ―is in fact
triply problematic‖); see also John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003, 2005–09 (2009) (arguing Court‘s
invocation of free-floating federalism values in constitutional interpretation is at odds with its turn
towards textualism and rejection of purposivism in statutory interpretation).
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import federalism values into administrative contexts requires a defense that
the Court has yet to supply—indeed, it has not articulated an administrative
federalism argument along these lines at all.331
Such a defense is especially needed because of the separation of powers
implications of assigning the states a special agency-policing role. As noted
above, animating the Summers line are concerns about restricting judicial
intrusion into administrative policysetting and management, on the grounds
that administrative decisions of this sort are the responsibility of elected
officials and involve issues the courts are institutionally ill-equipped to
resolve.332 Allowing states greater access to challenge federal agency policy
and functioning in federal court thus would entail potentially significant
trumping of these separation of powers concerns in the name of federalism.333
That separation of powers requirements may need to bend to accommodate
federalism is certainly a possible constitutional outcome; these are, after all,
both core constitutional structural principles.334 But the appropriate balance
between federalism and separation of powers concerns, and the responsibility
of the courts in striking that balance as opposed to Congress, are central issues
that the Court must address if indeed it intends to assign the states this role.
An alternative approach that focused more centrally on Congress would at
least mitigate many of these concerns about judicial overstepping. Congress
clearly has power to assign states a special role in particular federal regulatory
schemes, as is evident in recent enactments authorizing expanded state
enforcement of federal regulatory requirements.335 Congress also can provide
that ―broad regulations . . . [are] to be the object of judicial review directly,
even before the concrete effects normally required for APA review are felt.‖336
Moreover, Congress has some leeway to provide for suits that, absent such
authorization, would be deemed to involve too generalized a grievance to be
appropriately raised in federal court.337

331. Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 2101, 2107–09.
332. See supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text.
333. Cf. Bickel, supra note 284, at 89–90 (―It would make a mockery . . . of the
constitutional requirement of case or controversy . . . to countenance automatic litigation—and
automatic it would surely become—by states . . . . The consequent aggrandizement of the judicial
function is something to contemplate.‖).
334. See Massey, supra note 285, at 273–76 (noting ―both separation of powers and
federalism are structural doctrines designed to check concentration of power‖ and should ―join‖
in reaching that end).
335. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1042, 124 Stat. 1376, 2012–2014 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552) (providing
that state attorneys general may bring suit in federal district court to enforce statutory
requirements or regulations issued under the Act); Widman, supra note 141 (manuscript at 16–17)
(describing provisions for state enforcement in Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of
2008); see also Lemos, supra note 108, at 8–9 (listing other federal statutes authorizing state
enforcement)
336. Lujan v. Nat‘l Wildlife Fed‘n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990).
337. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (finding congressional ―power to
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before‖ (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S 555, 580 (1992)
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Whether this emphasis on Congress represents a plausible account of the
Court‘s recent decisions is another matter, however. In fact, it is hard to view
Massachusetts in this vein, given that the Court there made no mention of the
central role Congress assigned the states in implementing the CAA and instead
justified the states‘ special standing on their position in our constitutional
order.338 In addition, this approach leaves unanswered why the Court
concluded that Congress intended the states to play an agency-policing role in
Wyeth and the recent preemption decisions, but not in Buckman. Thus, even
for this alternative account to work the Court must provide greater clarification
about the basis on which it will infer that Congress intended the states to serve
as federal agency reformers.
CONCLUSION
The recent preemption decisions reveal a Court struggling to forge a
coherent doctrinal account of the relationship between the states and federal
agencies. The decisions are notable for their willingness to consider federal
agency failure in preemption analysis. But the Court offers little explanation
of why it is more comfortable using state law to reform overall agency
performance here than in other contexts. Although a distinction between direct
and indirect efforts at agency reform seems at first to offer an appealing
justification for the Court‘s approach, on more sustained analysis it proves
inadequate. As a result, defending the preemption decisions may require
invoking a more radical conception of the states as having a special role to play
in reforming federal administration. But for now that suggestion remains
implicit and inchoate. Future decisions—particularly in the preemption
context, but also those at the intersection of federalism and separation of
powers—will reveal whether this view of the states‘ role becomes a more
vibrant part of the Court‘s federalism and administrative law jurisprudence.

(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
338. See id. at 518–20; see also Stevenson, supra note 318, at 8–9 (noting this role as
possible justification for state standing); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 187, at 1038–39
(arguing Court should have emphasized provisions allowing California to obtain waiver for its
emission limits, which other states could follow). The Court did invoke congressional enactments
in its standing analysis, underscoring that Congress had provided a procedural right authorizing
challenges to agency action unlawfully withheld. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517–18, 520. As
other commentators have noted, the Court‘s characterization of this right as ―procedural‖ is
questionable. See Mank, States Standing, supra note 187, at 1747–52. More importantly here,
that procedural right was in no way limited to the states.

